College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1994

Understanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous
Citizen, the Managed Subject and the Role of the
Lawyer
Nancy Amoury Combs
William & Mary Law School, ncombs@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Combs, Nancy Amoury, "Understanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous Citizen, the Managed Subject and the Role of the Lawyer"
(1994). Faculty Publications. 152.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/152

Copyright c 1994 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Understanding Kaye Scholer: The
Autonomous Citizen, the Managed
Subject and The Role of the
Lawyer
Nancy Amoury Combst
The Office of Thrift Supervision's (OTS) unprecedented enforcement
action against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler (Kaye Scholer)
prompted howls of protest from the legal community. OTS, it was claimed,
was using its excessive power to redefine the role of the lawyer. This
Comment confirms that OTS sought to impose duties on Kaye Scholer that
conflict with professional ethics rules. The Comment then goes on to suggest that the conflict over professional responsibility in the Kaye Scholer
case reflects, more fundamentally, a conflict over the role of the citizen, and
the citizen's relationship with the state. Our adversarial system of dispute
resolution is founded on our democratic assumption of citizen autonomy.
Citizens are presumed to have independent interests and goals that the state
must take into account when it regulates their activities. By contrast, OTS
views the thrifts it regulates not as autonomous citizens but as instrumental
means of achieving OTS goals. This Comment contends that it is this divergence in the concept of the citizen that gave rise in the Kaye Scholer case to
the conflict regarding the appropriate role of the lawyer. The Comment
concludes by exploring some normative questions raised by the OTS regulatory scheme.
lNrn.ODUCTION

The failure of numerous savings and loan institutions in the 1980s 1 has
led to claims against lawyers and other professionals who advised those
Copyright © 1994 California Law Review, Inc.
t B.A. 1991, University of Portland; J.D. candidate 1994, Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of California, Berkeley.
I would like to thank Professor Robert Post for his patient assistance and encouragement. I also
thank my mother, Marjorie Amoury, my father, Robert J. Amoury, and my grandmother, Catherine
Hero, for all their support during law school; Flavia Rose for his careful, thoughtful editing; Jesse
Combs for his unique and special encouragement; and especially my husband Bruce, without whose
love and support this Comment would not have been written.
1. During the 1980s the savings and loan industry experienced its worst performance in its
160-year existence. Over the period 525 insolvent institutions were liquidated or sold at an
estimated present-value cost ... of $47 billion. Another eighteen institutions were simply
stabilized .•• at an estimated present-value cost of $7 billion. Despite all these closures, still
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institutions.2 The most expensive thrift failure of the decade was that of
Charles Keating's Lincoht Savings and Loan, which reportedly cost the federal government more than two billion dollars. 3 As a result of that failure,
on March 1, 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) filed a $275
million enforcement action against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and
Handler (Kaye Scholer), one of the law firms that represented Lincoln.
OTS also issued a temporary cease and desist order freezing the firm's
assets and the personal assets of three Kaye Scholer partners. OTS charged
Kaye Scholer with violating several OTS regulations and claimed that the
violations substantially increased losses to the thrift and the federal insurance fund. Six days after OTS filed its Notice of Charges, Kaye Scholer
settled the case for $41 million.4
The Kaye Scholer case. generated enormous controversy in the legal
community.5 Critics _of OTS maintained that OTS sought to impose duties
on Kaye Scholer that conflict with professional ethics rules. 6 These critics
argued that OTS is trying to redefine the role of the lawyer:
This Comment evaluates that claim and concludes that OTS regulations do impose ·obligations on lawyers that conflict with traditional legal
ethics rules. The OTS system of regulation does contemplate a different
role for the lawyer than that which grows out of the adversary system. The
Comment goes on to suggest, however, that this conflict over professional
responsibility reflects a more fundamental conflict. It is the thesis of this
Comment that the Kaye Scholer matter involves not merely the role of the
lawyer, but, more fundamentally, the role of the citizen and the citizen's
another 517 institutions were reporting insolvency but were still operating at the end of the
decade.
JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LoAN DEBACLE 1 (1991).
2. Between 1989 and 1992, the government recovered $1.7 billion from claims against
professional advisers associated with failed banks and thrifts. Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye,
Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. RBv.
1019, 1023 n.12 (1993).
3. STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., RlloULATION OP LAWYERS: STATI.ITES AND
STANDARDS i29 (1993).
4. For an in-depth discussion, see infra Part 11.
5. For just a sampling of the commentary, see, for example, GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at
729-78; Robert G. Day, Note, Administrative Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates? Implications for Legal
Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney liability, 45 STAN. L. RBv. 645 (1993); Susan Beck & Michael
Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAw., May 1992, at 68; Edward Brodsky, The 'Kaye Scholer'
Case, N.Y. LJ., May 22, 1992, at 1; Stephanie B. Goldberg, Welcome to the New Uncertainty, A.B.A.
J.,. July 1992, at 51; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 27, 1992, at 15. Additionally,
Southern California Law Review recently published a symposium, In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer,
Fiemwn, Hays and Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rnle of
Law, 66 S. CAL. L. RBv. 977 (1993).
6. See Lester Brickman, Has the Office of Thrift Supervision Changed the Relevant Etllics Rules
by its Actions in the Kaye, Scholer Matter, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATioNSHIP AFrER KAYE,
ScHOLER 79 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992); James Podgcrs,
Changing the Rules, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 53; Kaye, Scholer and the New Ethics Imperative, AM.
LAw., Sept 1992, at 64.
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relationship with the state. The Kaye Scholer controversy reflects a struggle between two different conceptions of what it means to be a citizen.
Part I describes OTS's statutory and regulatory scheme, and Part II
describes the Kaye Scholer litigation. Part ill examines the traditional role
of the lawyer that grows out of the adversary system, and with that information, Part IV concludes that the obligations OTS seeks to impose on lawyers
are in tension with the professional ethics rules ·that inform the lawyer's
traditional role.
This much is not surprising, given the furor in the legal community
over OTS's actions. Thus, Part V looks beyond the legal ethics rules and
the role of the lawyer to explore the conception of the citizen th.at underlies
the adversary system. Part V begins by observing that our democratic form
of government is premised ou the notion that citizens are autonomous. The
section goes on to suggest that the adversary system embodies this s_ame
concept of the autonomous citizen. Both the adversary system and the role
of the lawyer that grows out of it reflect the belief that citizens have
independent interests and goals that the state must take into account when
regulating the citizen's activities.
·
Part VI suggests that the OTS ·system embodies a different vision of
the citizen. The OTS system is structured to achieve its regulatory goals by
the most efficient means possible. The OTS system does not view the
thrifts it regulates as autonomous citizens who ~ave independent objectives.
Rather, the OTS system locates the thrifts within OTS's instrumental orientation. The OTS system defines the role of thrifts in terms of OTS' s regulatory goals and manipulates the thrifts according to those goals.
It is not surprising, then, that the OTS system and the adversary system
construct different roles for lawyers: The ethical obligations that we have
traditionally placed on lawyers are based in large part on the presumption of
citizen autonomy that underlies the adversary system. When we change the
concept of the citizen upon which a legal system is based, the role of the
lawyer will also change. Part VII conchides the Comment by touching on
some normative questions about the OTS system. While it is beyond the
scope of this Comment to evaluate the desirability of the OTS system in any
detail, Part VII examines several considerations that p:1ay be relevant to
such an inquiry.
I
THE OTS SYSTEM

A.

Events Leading to the Establishment of OTS

The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), established in 1932,
was for many years the federal regulatory authority for savings and loan
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institutions (S&Ls).7 In 1989, however, Congress enacted the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 8 to address
the failures of federally insured S&Ls. 9 FIRREA abolished the FHLBB and
created OTS 10 to take over many of its functions. The following two sections briefly discuss the S&L crisis and FIRREA, the legislation born of the
crisis.
1.

The S&L Crisis

The collapse of many of America's savings and loan institutions in the
1980s led to a staggering financial crisis. Between 1980 and 1991, over a
thousand S&Ls failed-more than seven times as many as in the previous
forty-six years. 11 The causes of the S&L crisis are complex and controversial. 12 A partial list of contributing factors includes: (1) poorly timed federal deregulation; (2) thrift mismanagement; (3) inadequate oversight,
supervision, and regulation by federal regulatory agencies and the Reagan
administration; (4) economic collapse in the Southwest; (5) radical deregulation by several large states; and (6) insider abuse and fraud. 13 In this
section I will focus on federal deregulation, inadequate supervision, and the
FHLBB' s contribution to these problems.
7. CARTER H. Gm.EMBE & DAviDS. HoU.AND, FEDERAL REOuLAnoN oP BANKING 1983-84, at
186 (1983). Kaye Scholer's dealings with the FHLBB gave rise to OTS's enforcement action.
8. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
9. Paul v. OTS, 763 F. Supp. 568,571 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Paul v.
Ryan, 948 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1991).
10. FIRREA placed OTS within the Treasury Department. FIRREA sec. 301, § 3(a), 103 Stat. at
278 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(a)). ''The placement of the OTS within the Treasury WIIS considered
quite important since the Congress believed that the OTS would thereby be less susceptible to lobbying
from the thrift industry or to pressures from individual Congressmen and Senators •..." LAWRBNCB J.
WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: Puauc Poucr LESsoNs FOR BANK AND THRJFr REOULAnoN 182 (1991).
11. From 1934 through 1979, a 46-year period, 143 S&Ls failed, costing the insurance fund $306
million. From 1980 through 1991, a 12-year period, 1073 S&Ls failed, costing $119 billion. U.S. GBN.
AccoUNnNG OFFicE, REPoRT TO CoNGRESSIONAL CoMMITTEES, BANK AND THRIFT REoULAnoN:
IMPROVEMBNTS NEEDED IN EXAMINAnON QUALITY AND RE0ULATORY STRUCTURE 8 (1993),
An S&L fails when its IISsets, such 115 loans and portfolio investments, become worth less than its
liabilities, which are mainly insured deposits. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 36-38. Although it is
difficult to generalize, S&Ls typically failed because many of their loans and investments lost value, for
example when borrowers failed to repay loans. Excessive opemting expenses often aggmvated the
·
problem. See id. at 118-19.
12. For a more detailed discussion of the history and the collapse of the S&L industry, see
generally BARTH, supra note 1; NED EicHLER, THE THRIFT DEBACLE (1989); MARnN MAYER, THE
GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE Cou.APSE OP THE SAVINGS AND LoAN INDUSTRY (1990);
STEPHBN Pizzo ET AL., INsiDE Joe: THE LoonNo OP AMERICA's SAVINGS AND LoANs (1989); WHrra,
supra note 10; Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FoRDHAM L. REv. 57 (1991); Robert J.
Laughlin, Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FoRDHAM L. REv. 5301 (1991).
13. H.R. REP. No. 54, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 294 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
86, 90.
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Federal Deregulation

A number of federal statutes contributed to the deregulation of the savings and loan industry. 14 The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act of 1978 15 partially increased the ceiling on federal depository insurance. 16 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 198017 phased out interest rate caps on bank and thrift
deposits; 18 raised federal deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 to
$1 00,000; 19 and permitted S&Ls to offer negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW) accounts.Z0 The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of
198221 allowed S&Ls to offer money market accounts, 22 to engage in agricultural and commercial lending (including commercial real estate lending),23 and to accept demand deposits. 24 It also permitted S&Ls to make
more consumer loans,25 and it increased the amounts of loans that depository institutions could make to one borrower.26

b.

Inadequate Supervision

At the same time that Congress was granting S&Ls broader investment
and lending powers, the federal government was reducing its regulatory
supervision over S&Ls.Z7 During the Reagan presidency, the Treasury
Department and the federal thrift regulatory agencies continually pressured
Congress to limit government intervention in the financial services industry.Z8 Notably, the Reagan administration refused to increase the number of
savings and loan examiners even though the thrift industry was going
14. For a more detailed account of the savings and loan deregulation, see NICHOLAS A. LASH,
BANKING LAws AND REGULATIONs: AN EcoNOMIC PERsPECTIVE 17-21 (1987); WHITE, supra note 10,
at 67-87.
15. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat 3641 (1978) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
16. /d. § 1401, 92 Stat at 3712-13 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a), 1728(d), 1787(c)).
17. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat 132 (1980) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
18. /d. §§ 201-210, 94 Stat at 142-45.
19. /d. § 308, 94 Stat at 147-48.
20. /d. § 303, 94 Stat at 146 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)).
21. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat 1469 (1982) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
22. /d. § 327, 96 Stat at 1501 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 3503).
23. /d. §§ 322, 325, 96 Stat at 1499, 1500 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(l)).
24. /d. § 312, 96 Stat at 1496-97 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)).
25. /d. § 329, 96 Stat. at 1502 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B)).
26. /d. § 401, 96 Stat at 1508-09 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 84). These lending limits applied by
their terms only to national banks. However, a different section of the Garn-St Germain Act extended
them to commereial loans made by S&Ls. /d. § 325, 96 Stat at 1500 (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(c)(l)).
27. Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institutions
Refonn, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of /989, 45 Bus. LAw. 1013, 1022 (1990).
·
28. H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 13, at 301, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 97.
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through its most significant restructuring since the Great Depression.29 By
the mid-1980s, even the FHLBB's top management understood that more
examiners were needed. Yet, the administration ignored the FHLBB's
repeated requests for more resources. 30

c.

Conflict of Interest in the FHLBB

The FHLBB had conflicting responsibilities which contributed to the
S&L crisis. 31 The FHLBB was responsible for chartering, examining, and
supervising federal savings asso~iations, 32 administering the depository
insurance obligations of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
· Corporation (FSLIC),33 and supervising the Federal Home Loan Banks in
the provision of credit and other services to savings associations. 34 The
FHLBB, then, as administrator of the FSLIC, was charged with protecting
the industry's insurance fund. 35 However, it also considered itself an industry promoter. 36 Witnesses testifying before the House Banking Committee
asserted that the Board's primary goal was to promote the thrift industry,
often at the expense of the deposit insurance fund. 37 The FHLBB pursued
this goal by relaxing capital standards and failing to bring enforcement
actions against thrift operators.38
2.

FIRREA

In response to the S&L cnsts, Congress enacted the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989.39
Congress was convinced that insufficient enforcement powers and inade29.

/d. "[T]he number of the field-force thrift examiners and supervisors were [sic] actually

reduced between 1981 and 1984 •..• Further, the numbers of examinations (audits) of thrifts were
substantially reduced between 1980 and 1983 and rose only slightly in 1984." WHITE, supra note 10, at
88 (including tables detailing the reduction in the FHLBB's staff and resources).
30. H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 13, at 301, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 97.
31. /d. at 302, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98.
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a) (1988) (repealed 1989).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988) (repealed 1989).
35. H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 13, at 302, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98.
36. !d. For instance, the FHLBB, as the chartering authority of a federal savings association, had
the authority to declare the savings association insolvent However,
the [FHLBB], as the operating head of the FSLIC, had a conflicting interest of minimizing the
number of savings associations that were declared insolvent because insolvencies would
deplete the insurance reserves of the FSLIC. Similarly, the [FHLBB], as administrative head
of the Federal Home Loan Banks, had an interest in ensuring that the Federal Home Loan
Banks only made advances to creditworthy savings associations; but at the same time it had an
interest, as operating head of the FSUC, in maximizing the availability of funds to financially
troubled savings associations.
Clark et al., supra note 27, at 1023 n.91.
37. H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 13, at 302, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98.
38. !d.
39. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat 183 (1989); see U.S. GEN. AccoUNTINo OFFICE, supra note 11,
at 3. For a more comprehensive discussion and critique ofFIRREA, see BARm, supra note 1, at 79-99;
WHITE, supra note 10, at 175-93.
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quate enforcement efforts contributed heavily to numerous thrift and bank
failures. 40 Believing that a massive increase in enforcement powers was
imperative, Congress swept aside objections from industry representatives
and conferred on federal banking regulators "the most extensive array of
administrative sanctions ever poss~ssed by American administrative agencies."41 Further, in response to the conflict of interest concerns discussed
above, FIRREA abolished the FHLBB 42 and allocated its conflicting functions to three separate bodies: the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Housing Finance Board.43
Since FIRREA, Congress has strengthened the power of bank regulators further by enacting the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud
Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 199044 and more recently the
FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.45
B.

The Office of Thrift Supervision

FIRREA established OTS to serve as the primary regulator of approximately 2600 federal and state-chartered thrifts.46 "OTS carries out that
responsibility by adopting regulations governing the savings and loan
industry, by examining and supervising thrift institutions and their affiliates,
and by taking whatever action is necessary to enforce their compliance with
federal laws and regulations."47
40. See H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 13, at 464-65, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 260-61;
see also S. REP. No. 19, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1989).
41. Lawrence G. Baxter, Judicial Responses to the Recent Enforcement Activities of the Federal
Banking Regulators, 59 FoRDHAM L. REv. Sl93, S201-02 (1991). Baxter continued: "To prove that
Congress was serious, the relevant legislative provisions were accompanied by exhortations from
Congress to deploy these new powers to the maximum extent feasible." ld. at S203. For example, the
conference report on FIRREA stated that ''the Conferees intend for the Federal banking agencies to
aggressively utilize this new authority." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 222, IOist Cong., 1st Sess. 440 (1989),
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 479.
42. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 40I(a)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 354 (1989).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1422(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (directing the Federal Housing Finance Board to
supervise the Federal Home Loan Banks); id. § 1463(a)(l) (directing OTS to examine and regulate
thrifts); id. § 1811 (directing the FDIC to insure deposits in thrifts).
For the argument that FIRREA did not solve the conflict of interest problems because it did not
"recognize that federal regulators have incentives to keep insolvent institutions open," see Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA, aud the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of
the Kaye, Scholer Case from the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115, 1135
(1993). Macey and Miller maintain that federal deposit insurance and the bizarre criteria by which
banking agencies are evaluated create "strong incentives for regulators to delay closing insolvent
financial institutions. In fact, banking regulators have strong incentives to delay identifying problem
banks, to deny the severity of the banking crisis generally, and to postpone meaningful action for as long
as possible regardless of the cost." ld. at 1133.
44. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4859 (1990) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 12 &
18 U.S.C.).
45. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
46. FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 843 (6th ed. 1990).
47. ld.
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Persons Over Whom OTS has Power

FIRREA broadened the scope of persons who are subject to regulatory
control. FIRREA abolished the olq list of individual targets48 and replaced
them with the new term "institution-affiliated party."49 An institution-affiliated party is broadly defined to include, among others, any shareholder,
consultant, or joint venture partner who participates in the conduct of the
association's affairs, and any independent contractor, such as an attorney,
appraiser, or accountant, who knowingly or recklessly participates in a violation of any law, regulation, breach of fiduciary duty or unsafe or unsound
practice that caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial loss
to a federally insured thrift. 50
In addition, prior to FIRREA, the Fill.BB could initiate enforcement
proceedings only against persons who were still associated with the thrift. 5 1
By contrast, OTS can proceed against an institution-affiliated party even if
that party resigns, is fired, or becomes otherwise separated from the thrift,
so long as notice of the action is served within six years from the time of
the individual's separation.52

2.

OTS Oversight of S&L Management

FIRREA gave OTS broad oversight powers over the thrift industry.
Thrifts must notify OTS at least thirty days before adding a "senior executive officer'' if the thrift has been chartered for less than two years, has
undergone a change in control within the preceding two years, or is undercapitalized or otherwise in a "troubled condition."53 OTS may reject the
addition within thirty days of receiving notice from the association. 54
OTS also has broad powers to remove or suspend institution-affiliated
parties. OTS may remove an institution-affiliated party from office and
prohibit that person from ever participating in the affairs of any federally
insured institution.5 5 While waiting for a final order of removal or prohibi48. Under earlier statutes, the FHLBB could issue cease and desist orders against, among others,
any person participating in the conduct of the affairs of the association if the FSLIC determined that the
person (i) had or was engaged in unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business of the
association, or (ii) had violated or was violating any law, regulation, written condition imposed by the
FSLIC in connection with the approval of an application or other request by the association, or written
agreement entered into between the association and the FSLIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (1988)
(amended 1989).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (Supp. IV 1992).
50. ld. § 1813(u)(3), (4).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)-(g) (1988) (repealed 1989).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
53. ld. § 1831i(a). OTS has proposed a rule that defines "senior executive officer" expansively to
include an institution's general counsel and any non-employee retained to perform similar functions. 56
Fed. Reg. 37,162 (Aug. 5, 1991).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1831i(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
55. ld. § 1818(e). OTS must show that the institution-affiliated party (1) violated a law,
regulation, final cease-and-desist order, or written agreement or condition, or engaged in an unsafe or
unsound practice in coMection with any insured depository institution or business institution, or has
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tion, OTS may temporarily suspend an institution-affiliated party if it
believes that a suspension is necessary to protect the institution or its depositors.56 OTS may also immediately suspend any institution-affiliated party
who has been charged under federal or state law with a crime involving
dishonesty or breach of trust. 57 Even if the party is eventually acquitted,
OTS may still remove him using its general removal power.58 A person
who is removed, prohibited, or suspended is precluded from participating in
any manner in the affairs of any federally insured depository institution.59

3.

OTS Access to Information

In order to regulate effectively, OTS needs information about a thrift's
practices. " 'Unfettered access, including the ability to appear at [a thrift]
without advance notice, is essential to the fulfillment of [the regulators']
function.' " 60 This section will discuss two of OTS's most effective means
of gaining information: examinations and disclosure requirements.

a.

Examinations

OTS carefully monitors all aspects of a thrift's practice by conducting
periodic, comprehensive examinations. 61 OTS may examine a thrift at any
time, without giving it advance notice, 62 and the thrift must pay the costs of
the examination.63 Moreover, in order for OTS to examine the thrift thoroughly and efficiently, the thrift must
establish and maintain such accounting and other records as will
provide an accurate and complete record of all business it transacts,
and the documents, files, and other material or property comprising
said records shall at all times be available for such examination and
breached a fiduciary duty; and (2) that the violation, practice, or breach has caused or probably will
cause a financial loss to the institution, has prejudiced or could prejudice the depositors' interests, or has
produced a pecuniary gain or other benefit to the institution-affiliated party; and (3) that the violation,
practice or breach either involves personal dishonesty or demonstrated "willful or continuing disregard"
for the safety or soundness of the institution. ld. § 1818(e)(1).
56. ld. § 1818(e)(3). The respondent may seek a judicial stay of the suspension order by applying
to the appropriate United States District Court within ten days after service of the suspension order. !d.
§ 1818(f).
57. Id. § 1818(g)(1). OTS must still make a determination that the individual's continued
participation poses a threat to the interests of the creditors or threatens public confidence in the
institution. However, unlike § 1818(e), § 1818(g)(l) does not provide for district court jurisdiction to
stay the suspension.
58. ld. § 1818(g)(l)(D)(ii).
59. ld. § 1818(e)(7).
60. Beek & Orey, supra note 5, at 70 (quoting a 1986 letter from BJ. Davis, FHLBB director for
examinations in San Francisco, to Kaye Scholer partner Peter Fishbein).
61. 12 C.F.R. § 563.170(a) (1993). For a more detailed description of bank and thrift
examinations, see U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 11, at 19-20.
62. 12 C.F.R. § 563.170(a) (1993).
63. ld.
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audit wherever any of said records, documents, files, material, or
property may be.64
Thrifts must also notify OTS before moving any records from a home office
to a branch office. 65
To ensure compliance with its examination requirements, OTS may
impose a civil money penalty on thrifts that refuse to allow an examination
or that refuse to provide information that must be disclosed during an examination.66 Moreover, if the thrift's records are incomplete or inaccurate in a
way that prevents OTS from ascertaining the thrift's financial condition or
· determining the details of any fiuancial transaction, OTS may issue a temporary cease and desist order requiring the thrift to cease any activity or
practice giving rise to the incomplete or inaccurate books. 67

b.

Disclosure Requirements

OTS's disclosure requirements, like its examination requirements,
enable OTS to monitor thri~' practices. Thrifts must periodically provide
reports to OTS.68 OTS prescribes the timing and manner of the reports.69
Thrifts and institution-affiliated parties must not make oral or written statements to OTS that are misleading as to material facts, or that omit any
material facts concerning any matter within OTS's jurisdiction.70
OTS highly values candid disclosure. Accordingly, when setting fines
for violations, OTS regulators consider the thrift's practice of disclosure.
Circumstances indicating that the thrift concealed the offending conduct
may result in an enhanced penalty, while cooperation with regulators is
considered a mitigating factor. 71 OTS penalties, then, are designed not only
to induce thrifts to obey OTS's substantive rules, but also to encourage
thrifts to assist OTS. by disclosing all relevant information.
In summary, OTS regulations require thrifts to provide full access to
government examiners.72 Thrifts can have no secrets from the regulators.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

ld. § 563.170(c).
ld. § 563.170(d).

12 U.S.C. § 1467(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
ld. § 1818(c)(3)(A)(i).
12 C.F.R. § 563.180(a) (1993).
ld.
ld. § 563.180(b)(l). '
Michael S. Helfer & Stuart Cane, Enforcement Actions Against Banks and Thrifts, in
LmGATING FoR AND AaAJNST nm FDIC AND THE RTC 1992, at 83, 125 (PLI Commercial Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 625, 1992).
72. "[T]he applicable statutes and regulations give federal officials a virtually unlimited right to
inspect thrift practices . . .." David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145, 1176 q993).
·
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Enforcement Mechanisms Available toOTS

OTS has numerous mechanisms for enforcing its regulations. Some of
the most important are cease and desist orders, temporary cease and desist
orders, civil money penalties, capital directives, and thrift receiverships.

a.

Cease and Desist Orders

OTS may issue a cease and desist order on the grounds that: (i) the
respondent is engaging or has engaged, or there is reasonable cause to
believe that the respondent is about to engage, in any unsafe or unsound
practice in conducting the business of the institution; or (ii) the respondent
is violating, or has violated, or there is reasonable cause to believe that the
respondent is about to violate, any law, rule, regulation, or written agreement with OTS.73 OTS commences a cease and desist order by filing a
Notice of Charges.74 Upon receiving the Notice of Charges, the respondent
may either consent to the order or appear at an administrative hearing to
contest the charges.75 An administrative law judge (AU), employed by
OTS, presides over the hearing. 76 ALJs are Article I judges who do not
have the salary protection and life tenure that Article ill judges enjoy.77
The ALJ receives evidence and can rule on some motions; however,
only the Director of OTS has the power to decide motions to dismiss the
proceeding or other motions that result in a final determination of the merits
of the proceeding. 78 After hearing the evidence, the ALJ makes findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and issues a recommendation to OTS.79
The Director of OTS has substantial discretion to adopt, rejeet, or
modify the ALJ' s recommendation. 80 If the Director finds that the record
made at the administrative hearing establishes the violation described in its
Notice of Charges, then OTS may issue the cease and desist order. The
cease and desist order will become effective in thirty days unless it is set
aside before that time by OTS or a reviewing court. 81
The respondent may seek judicial review of the order in a federal court
of appeals within thirty days. 82 The scope of the review is governed by
Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 83 Accordingly, the
court must sustain OTS's findings if they are supported by substantial evi73.

12 U.S.C. § 1818{b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).

74. ld.
75. ld.
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) provides for hearings pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
77. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 730.
78. 12 C.F.R. § 509.5{b)(7) (1993). ,
79. ld. § 509.38.
80. See, e.g., id. §§ 509.4, 509.39, 509.40; Central Nat'1 Bank v. United States Dep't of Treasury,
912 F.2d 897, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1990).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1818{b)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
82. ld. § 1818(h)(2).
83. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1988).
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dence in the record as a whole. 84 And the court will not disturb OTS's
choice of remedy unless it is an abuse of discretion or otherwise arbitrary or
capricious. 85

b.

Temporary Cease and Desist Orders

OTS also has the authority to issue temporary cease and desist orders
whenever it determines that the conduct specified in its Notice of Charges is
likely to dissipate the thrift's assets or earnings significantly, or is likely to
weaken the thrift's condition or otherwise prejudice the interests of depositors before the permanent cease and desist proceedings can be completed. 86
Such orders may require the respondent to take affirmative steps to prevent
or remedy any insolvency, dissipation, condition, or prejudice pending the
completion of the permanent cease and desist proceedings. 87 Temporary
cease and desist orders are effective immediately upon service without a
prior hearing. 88 The controversial Kaye Scholer "asset freeze" was accomplished by means of a temporary cease and desist order. 89
A party served with a temporary cease and desist order has ten days to
apply to a United States District Court for an injunction setting aside, limiting, or suspending the order.90 The chances of getting the order overturned,
however, are remote because OTS must meet only a minimal standard of
proof to justify the order. 91 For instance, in Parker v. Ryan 92 the Fifth
Circuit, in upholding an OTS temporary cease and desist order,93 endorsed
OTS's contention that a temporary order is judicially enforceable if OTS
can present "a prima facie case of illegality, based upon the agency's
demonstrated compliance with its procedures and [with] the statutory
84. Akin v. OTS, 950 F.2d 1180, 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
85. Id. " 'The assessment of a penalty is particularly delegated to the [director]. The choice then
of a sanction is not to be overturned unless "it is unwarranted in law" or "without justification in
fact" • " Id. (quoting Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185·86 (1973)); see also
Del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (Supp.1V 1992). Prior to FlRREA, the FHLBB had to make a greater
showing in order to issue a temporary cease and desist order. The FHLBB was required to show that the
association or a person participating in the affairs of the association was engaged in an unsafe or
unsound practice, the continuation of which was likely to cause insolvency or "substantial" dissipation
of the association's assets. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(3)(A) (1988) (amended 1989); id. § 1730(f)(l)
(repealed 1989).
87. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
88. Id.
89. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 51.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
91. Since 1990 OTS has issued 21 temporary cease and desist orders. Courts have upheld OTS's
exercise of its discretion in all but one of the cases in which the orders were challenged. Harris
Weinstein et al., Asset Preservation Orders by the Office of Thrift Supervision, in EMBROINO Issues IN
THE "Nnw" BusiNESs OP BANKJNo 447,453 (PU Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. A-637, 1992) [hereinafter EMBROINO Issues].
92. 959 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1992).
93. The order prohibited Parker from disposing of any funds or assets other than ordinary
household expenditures ofless than $5000 and required him to post security in an amount exceeding $13
million (reduced by OTS to $100,000 during the district court enforcement proceedings). Id. at 581-82.
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grounds for issuing a temporary order." 94 The only evidence OTS has to
provide as part of its prima facie case is "a verified statement of the specific
facts giving rise to violations or improprieties."95 The court also held that
Parker was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the district court unless
he disputed a fact material to OTS's prima facie case.96 OTS, then, can
freeze the assets of institution-affiliated parties without prior judicial
approval. 97 Courts have upheld such orders against due process challenges,
reasoning that the availability of judicial review within ten days after the
issuance of the order is constitutionally adequate.98

c.

Civil Money Penalties

FIRREA dramatically increased the occasions for and the amounts of
civil money penalties that can be imposed on thrifts and institution-affiliated parties.99 OTS sends a written notice of a civil money penalty, 100 and
then the respondent must request an administrative hearing within twenty
days, or else the assessment becomes a final and unappealable order. 101
Judicial review of civil money penalties is also governed by the APA. 102
Thus, courts are "limited to determining whether the agency substantially
complied with statutory and regulatory procedures, whether substantial evidence supports its factual determinations, and whether its action was an
abuse of discretion." 103
94. ld. at 583.
95. ld.
96. ld. at 584; cf. Landmark Land Co. v. OTS, 990 F.2d 807, 812 (5th Cir. 1993) (requiring an
evidentiary hearing because "the record reveals several disputes of material fact that the district court
must necessarily resolve").
97. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding OTS temporary order
requiring Spiegel to pay $21 million in restitution within twenty-four hours of the order's issuance, or
face daily-accruing fines), cert. denied, 112 S. Cl 1584 (1992); Paul v. OTS, 763 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (enforcing an OTS temporary order requiring Paul to post security for an alleged $30 million
debt owed to his former institution, and requiring prior OTS approval for any transfer of Paul's assets in
excess of $5000), affd without opinion sub nom., Paul v. Ryan, 948 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1991).
98. See, e.g., Paul v. OTS, 763 F. Supp. at 572 (due process does not require a predeprivation
hearing because OTS actions are a response to an emergency situation); Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1439-42
(predeprivation hearing not required because OTS action satisfied the three-pronged test of Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)); see also DiStefano v. OTS, 787 F. Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1992).
99. Baxter, supra note 41, at S203.
Prior to FIRREA, the federal banking agencies were generally restricted to imposing civil money
penalties on persons who had violated a final cease and desist order, and the maximum civil penalty was
$1000 for each day the violation continued. FIRREA expanded the grounds upon which the federal
banking agencies can assess civil money penalties and jncreased the maximum amount of those
penalties. Clark et al., supra note 27, at 1031.
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(E)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
101. [d. § 1818(i)(2)(H), (E)(ii).
102. [d. § 1818(h)(2).
103. Burke v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 940 F.2d 1360, 1365 (lOth Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Cl 1957 (1992).
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Capital Directives

OTS establishes minimum levels of capital that thrifts must maintain,
and it has two distinct mechanisms for enforcing those minimums. 104 OTS
may treat any failure to maintain the required level of capital as an unsafe
or unsound practice, 105 providing a basis for a cease and desist order.
Alternatively, or in addition, OTS may issue a directive requiring the thrift
to submit and adhere to an acceptable plan setting forth the "means and
timing" by which the thrift intends to comply with the capital requirement.106 The "capital directive," and any plan submitted in response, are
enforceable to the same extent as a cease and desist order that has become
final.107
As noted above, OTS may issue a final cease and desist order only
after an administrative hearing. 108 However, even though capital directives
have the same legal force as fmal cease and desist orders, the statute authorizing capital directives 109 does not incorporate the administrative hearing
and judicial review provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h), and it does not
expressly provide any other mechanisms for judicial review. After examining ~e statute, the Fifth Circuit in FDIC v. Bank ofCoushatta 110 held that a
capital directive is an agency action "committed to agency discretion by
law" for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act 111 and is therefore
completely unreviewable in the courts. 112

e.

Conservatorship and Receivership Provisions

OTS may seize a thrift without notice or hearing and place it under
conservatorship or into receivership if any of a number of conditions are
met. 113 The thrift may then bring an action in a federal district court
requesting that OTS remove the conservator or receiver, and the court "shall
upon the merits" dismiss the action or direct the Director to remove the
conservator or receiver. 114 Although courts have differed on their interpretation of the phr~e "on the merits," the prevalent practice is for courts to
104. 12 u.s.c. § 3907 (1988).
105. /d. § 3907(b)(1).
106. /d. § 3907(b)(2). OTS has strictly enforced its capital standards, see Monroe W. Karmin, Oh,
that Costly S&L Mess!: Ineptitude and Turmoil are Driving up the Tab for Taxpayers, U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., Apr. 9, 1990, at 37, and it has been careful about approving capital plans. By March 1990,
OTS had ruled on 172 capital plans but had approved only 49. Oversight Hearings on the Financial

Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 486 (1990).
107. 12 u.s.c. § 3907(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
109. 12 u.s.c. § 3907 (1988).
110. 930 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 170 (1991).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988).
112. Coushatta, 930 F.2d at 1129.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) & (B) (Supp. IV 1992).
114. /d. § 1464(d)(2)(B).
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review only the administrative record and to uphold the agency's action
unless the court finds it to be arbitrary or capricious. us

C.

Summary

In summary, Congress bestowed on OTS wide-ranging and substantial
control over all aspects of thrift practice. OTS examines thrifts whenever it
chooses, and it requires thrifts to submit regular reports and to volunteer all
material facts in those reports. Further, OTS has a number of powerful
enforcement mechanisms available and exercises substantial control over
the adjudicatory proceedings that result from its enforcement actions.
Finally, although most OTS actions are reviewable by a federal court of
appeals, the scope of the review is narrow. This background enables us
now to examine OTS's litigation with Kaye Scholer.

II
THE KAYE ScHOLER CoNTRoVERSY

Charles Keating acquired Lincoln Savings and Loan in 1984. 116 The
FHLBB examined Lincoln in 1986 and identified numerous violations and
questionable practices.n7 Kaye Scholer represented Lincoln in a February
1987 inquiry regarding Lincoln's alleged forgery and backdating of documents. us The FHLBB examined Lincoln again in 1988 and this time identified "aggressive, risk-prone" practices at Lincoln, putting "the continued
viability of the association in jeopardy." 119 Kaye Scholer again responded
to the FHLBB's findings on Lincoln's behalf. 120 In April of 1989 the
FHLBB seized Lincoln. 121
On March 1, 1992, OTS filed an 83-page Notice of Charges 122 for a
cease and desist order alleging that Kaye Scholer violated numerous
FHLBB regulations while representing Lincoln. The Notice of Charges
requested restitution of $275 million. 123 At the same time, OTS also filed a
temporary cease and desist order124 freezing Kaye Scholer's assets and the
personal assets of three Kaye Scholer partners. Specifically, the temporary
115. See infra notes 288-296 and accompanying text.
116. MAYER, supra note 12, at 171. For an interesting account of Charles Keating and Lincoln
Savings, see id. at 165-86.
117. Peter M. Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, paras. 17-18 (Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Notice of
Charges]. The OTS orders in the Kaye Scholer matter are reprinted in Ttm ArroRNEY-CuENT
RELATIONSHIP .AFTER KAYE, ScHoLER, supra note 6, and in EMERGING IssUES, supra note 91. The
Notice of Charges is also reprinted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 734.
118. Notice of Charges, supra note 117, para. 19.
119. !d. para. 20.
120. /d. para. 21.
121. !d. para. 5.
122. Notice of Charges, supra note 117.
123. /d. para. 185.
124. Peter M. Fishbein, OTS AP-92-20 (Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Temporary Cease and Desist
Order].
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cease and desist order required the firm to escrow 25% of most partners'
shares of firm earnings and to escrow greater percentages of partners Peter
Fishbein's and Karen Katzman's earnings. 125 It required the firm to notify
OTS in writing five days before making any expenditures greater than
$50,000. 126 And it restricted how the firm, its partners, and their families
could dispose of their assets. 127
Broadly speaking, the Notice of Charges made three types of
claims. 128 The fust type of claim alleged that the firm's lawyers knowingly
and repeatedly misrepresented facts to the FHLBB. Many of the alleged
125. !d. para. 14.b.
126. ld. para. 14.a.
127. !d. para. 16.a. OTS offered few justifications for issuing the temporary cease and desist order
against Kaye Scholer. OTS's head counsel, Harris Weinstein, has refused to elabomte officially on why
OTS imposed the temporary order. Don J. DeBenedictis, The Big Freeze, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 58.
The order itself states that Fishbein, Katzman, and another partner, Lynn Toby Fisher, "have failed to
comply with a subpoena for information about their finances." Temporary Cease and Desist Order,
supra note 124, para. 13. The order further alleges that "Kaye Scholer has threatened to amend its
professional liability insurance policy so as to impair collectibility of any judgment requiring
restitution." !d.
Critics have accused OTS of using the freeze to force Kaye Scholer into a mpid settlement. See
Excerpts: Regulators and Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 10; see also DeBenedictis, supra, at 60
("Some outsiders charge that the Kaye Scholer freeze was a scare tactic meant to panic other firms the
OTS might pursue into settling quickly."). However, Stuart Gerson, head of the Justice Department's
civil division, told American Lawyer that OTS ordered the freeze in order to keep the firm from
disbanding. Beck & Orey, supra note 5, at 75. A government official stated that "we needed [Kaye
Scholer] to stay together, to continue to make money." ld.
Professors Macey and Miller argue that the freeze order was inappropriate and that OTS "may have
lacked statutory authority" to order the freeze when it did. Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 1136.
They maintain that "[t]he relevant provisions of the statute make it clear that directors, officers,
consultants, attorneys, appmisers, and accountants face the prospect of a freeze order only for engaging
in activities that are likely to result in adverse effects on insured financial institutions." !d. at 1135.
When OTS filed its notice of charges against Kaye Scholer in 1992, the firm's actions could no longer
be said to threaten harm to Lincoln's financial position, given that OTS had seized Lincoln three years
earlier. !d. at 1136.
Although Harris Weinstein has spoken little about the reasons for ordering the freeze, he has shown
no such reluctance to defend the scope of the freeze. He has maintained that the order was "cmfted to
strike a careful balance between the interests of [Kaye Scholer] and the interests of the taxpayers.''
Harris Weinstein, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Association of Community Bankers (Mar. 23, 1992), in
EMERGING IssUES, supra note 91, at 391, 401. According to Weinstein, the order permitted the firm to
continue its normal financial life while merely requiring the firm to give OTS advance notice of any
unusual financial or organizational changes. !d.
128. It is difficult to separate and categorize OTS's claims because the agency did not clearly
explain the theories of liability upon which it based its allegations. For nearly every claim, OTS charged
Kaye Scholer with violating the sarue four OTS regulations. They are 12 C.F.R. § 563.170(c) (formerly
12 C.F.R. § 563.17-1(c) (1986)), requiring record-keeping and disclosure; 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b)(1)
(formerly 12 C.F.R. § 563.18(b)(l) (1986)), prohibiting knowingly making false and misleading
statements of material facts to the agency and omitting material facts concerning any matters within the
agency's jurisdiction; 12 C.F.R. § 513.4(a)(3), prohibiting dilatory, obstructionist, egregious,
contemptuous, contumacious, or other unethical or improper professional conduct before the agency;
and 12 C.F.R. § 513.4(a)(4), prohibiting willfully aiding and abetting the violation of any laws
administered by the agency and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Nevertheless, one can dmw gencml distinctions among three types of claims.
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misrepresentations concerned Lincoln's financial position. 129 Second, OTS
accused Kaye Scholer of breaching its professional duties. For instance,
OTS claimed that Kaye Scholer failed to provide competent advice when it
allegedly advised Lincoln that certain transactions were legally
grandfathered under banking regulations while knowing that key documents
had been backdated. 130 Third, OTS charged that on other occasions, Kaye
Scholer lawyers made factual representations to the FHLBB that revealed
less than all the information known to Kaye Scholer. For example, when
Lincoln's accountants resigned, Kaye Scholer transmitted a copy of
Lincoln's SEC filing (not prepared by Kaye Scholer) stating that the
accountants had given Lincoln a clean bill of health. Kaye Scholer did not
tell the FHLBB, however, that, prior to their resignation, Lincoln's auditors
gave Kaye Scholer a confidential report raising significant questions about
Lincoln's financial condition. 131 In a similar vein, OTS claimed that Kaye
Scholer was aware of information suggesting that certain transactions that
Lincoln had classified as loans might be more appropriately classified as
joint ventures. Kaye Scholer failed to disclose this information, instead
maintaining that the transactions were properly classified as loans. 132
Assuming that the facts are as OTS alleged them, the first category of
claims is relatively uncontroversial from a professional ethics standpoint.
Lawyers may not make false statements, 133 nor may they aid or abet illegal
conduct. 134 The second category of claims is similarly uncontroversial.
Although unrelated third parties normally cannot sue a lawyer for malpractice, 135 OTS receives all the rights the thrift had when it succeeds to the
129. For instance, OTS claimed that Kaye Scholer knew, among other things, that Lincoln engaged
in linked transactions involving sham sales of stock or property to related entities at inflated prices in
order to create artificial profits, Notice of Charges, supra note 117, paras. 58-73; that Lincoln employed
woefully inadequate underwriting practices, id. paras. 84-87; and that Lincoln employees stuffed and
sanitized the files to mask deficiencies in Lincoln's underwriting, id. paras. 76-78. Yet in its 1989
submission to the FHLBB,just four months before the FHLBB shut Lincoln down, Kaye Scholer stated
that "Lincoln's managerial skill, its sound diversification of investments and its prudent underwriting are
all demonstrated by the unqualified success of its investment program." /d. para. 70. And in its 1987
submission to the FHLBB, Kaye Scholer maintained that "[w]hat is unusual about Lincoln's
underwriting is its particular emphasis on, and the thoroughness of, its underwriting of the collateral."
!d. para. 88.
130. /d. paras. 22-35.
131. !d. paras. 36-44.
132. !d. paras. 107-38.
133. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 4.1 (1983) ("[A) lawyer shall not
knowingly •.• make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person ..• .''); MoDEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmiLITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980) ("[A) lawyer shall not ... [k)nowingly make a
false statement of law or fact j.
134. See MoDEL RULES oF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule l.2{d) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent
.••.");MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmiLITY DR 7-102{A){7) (1980) ("[A) lawyer shall not
•.. [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent").
135. See Calamari v. Grace, 469 N.Y.S.2d 942, 945 (App. Div. 1983).
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position of the thrift upon insolvency. 136 Consequently, OTS may assert the
thrift's malpractice claims against its lawyers. Hence, these two categories
of claims primarily tum on factual determinations regarding Kaye Scholer's
knowledge and conduct.
The third category of claims, by contrast, is controversial. These are
the claims that caused the furor in the legal community. These claims are
seen as calling into question the appropriate role of the lawyer because even
if Kaye Scholer were to concede the facts that OTS alleged, it could still
maintain that its representation conformed entirely with professional ethics
rules. Thus, these claims have the capacity to alter significantly the lawyer's traditional role. This Comment, therefore, is concerned with the third
category of claims.
OTS relied for its third category of claims on 12 C.P.R.
§ 563.180(b)(l), 137 which prohibits knowingly making any statement to
OTS that omits a material fact concerning a matter within OTS's jurisdiction. 138 Although there is scant law interpreting the scope of
§ 563.180(b)(l), Harris Weinstein, former· OTS chief counsel, maintains
that it places a disclosure burden on attorneys similar to the broad disclosure obligations of the Securities and Exchange Commission's controversial
rule IOb-5. 139 That rule penalizes not just false statements but also the failure "to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." 140
136. See Steve France, Savings and Loan Lawyers, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 52, 52; Jackson, supra
note 2, at 1026.
137. Formerly 12 C.F.R. § 563.18(b)(l) (1986).
138. Specifically, the regulation provides:
No savings association or director, officer, agent, employee, affiliated person or other person
participating in the conduct of the affairs of such association nor any person filing or seeking
approval of any application shall knowingly: (1) Make any written or oral statement to the
Office or to an agent, representative or employee of the Office that is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact or omits to state a material fact concerning any matter within the
jurisdiction of the Office.
OTS has generally argued that Kaye Scholer not only omitted material facts but that the omissions
rendered Kaye Scholer's other statements false and misleading. See, e.g., Notice of Charges, supra note
117, para. 72.
139. Weinstein, supra note 127, at 395.
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). For a general discussion of when rule lOb-5 and related
provisions penalize the failure to state a material fact, see 4 Loms Loss & JoEL SELIOMAN, SEcURmllS
REGULATION 2052-57 (3d ed. 1990); 7 id. at 3444-46 (3d ed. 1991). There is much litemture on the
obligations that the securities laws impose on lawyers. See, e.g., Dennis J. Block & Charles J. Ferris,
SEC Rule 2(e)- A New Standard for Ethical Conduct or an Unauthorized Web of Ambiguity?, 11 CAP.
U. L. REv. 501 (1982); Joseph C. Daley & Roberta S. Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries
at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMoRY LJ. 747 (1975); Stuart C. Goldberg, Policing Responsibilities of the
Securities Bar: The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional ResponsibilityConsiderations for Expertizing Securities Attorneys, 19 N.Y. L.F. 221 (1973); Roberta S. Karmel,
Attorneys' Securities Lows Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153 (1972); Frederick D. Lipman, The SEC's
Reluctant Police Force: A New Role fo~ Lawyers." 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1974); Lewis D. Lowenfcls,
Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of
Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 412 (1974); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability
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OTS has maintained that it usually does not apply § 563.180(b)(l) to
lawyers. But it justified the move in the Kaye Scholer case on the ground
that Kaye Scholer allegedly demanded that all FHLBB requests for information be directed to Kaye Scholer. 141 Because of this "interposition Of the
firm between the regulators and the institution," 142 OTS alleged that Kaye
Scholer was not just Lincoln's lawyer but its agent in the examination process. ''This was the basis for the charge that Kaye Scholer made itself
responsible as an agent for Lincoln's compliance with the Bank Board's
disclosure and recordkeeping regulations." 143
Had the case gone to trial, it would have been brought before an
administrative law judge in accordance with the procedures for cease and
desist orders set out above. 144 However, Kaye Scholer agreed to settle the
case six days after OTS served it with the Notice of Charges. The
Settlement Order requires Kaye Scholer to pay OTS $41 million in restitution, 145 and it bars partners Peter Fishbein and Karen Katzman from performing any work for federally insured depository institutions. 146 In
addition, the settlement requires Kaye Scholer to adhere to certain policies
in the future. I will discuss only the three most notable.
First, Kaye Scholer must appoint a ]?anking partner with at least ten
years banking law experience to supervise Kaye Scholer's representation of
insured depository institutions. 147 For instance, the· Settlement Order provides that "[n]o document to be prepared by Kaye Scholer for submission
to a federal bank regulatory agency shall he submitted to the agency in the
absence of review by the banking partner in charge of the matter and a
second partner in the Banking Group." 148 ,
Second, the settlement imposes enhanced due diligence obligations on
Kaye Scholer. For instance, if Kaye Scholer is retained to provide an opinUnder the Securities Laws, 45 Sw. LJ. 711 (1991); William K.C. Dippel, Comment, Attorney
Responsibility and Carter Under SEC Rule 2(e): The Powers That Be and the Fear of the Flock. 36 Sw.
L.J. 897 (1982).
141. See Notice of Charges, supra note 117, paras. 45-47.
142. Weinstein, supra note 127, at 397.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text
145. Peter M. Fishbein, OTS AP No. 92-24, para. 17 (Mar. 1992) [hereinafter Settlement Order].
146. Peter M. Fishbein, OTS AP Nos. 92-25 and 92-26 (Mar. 11, 1992) (Orders of Prohibition from
Participating in the Conduct of the Affairs of an Insured Depository Institution).
147. Settlement Order, supra note 145, para. 4. However, OTS provides a de minimis exception to
the requirement The Settlement Order only requires Kaye Scholer to appoint a banking partner as
supervisor when Kaye Scholer
(i) acts as general counsel, banking regulatory counsel, or securities counsel to an insured
depository institution, or as counsel for such institution in connection with any federal
regulatory examination without regard to the anticipated or actual value of such work, or (ii)
anticipates performing or performs other legal services for an insured depository institution,
excluding workout or collection work, of a value of $600,000 or more at Kaye Scholer's
regular billing rates during any 12 consecutive month period.

Id.
148. Id.

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 681 1994

682

CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:663

ion on a matter and it knows that another law firm previously rendered an
opinion on the same matter or a related matter, then Kaye Scholer must
obtain the first firm's opinion before issuing its own opinion. If Kaye
Scholer's opinion differs from the first firm's, then Kaye Scholer must set
forth the other firm's opinion in its own opinion letter and explain why
Kaye Scholer reached a different conclusion. 149
Finally, several settlement provisions were apparently designed to
force Kaye Scholer to "practice the whole law," as Harris Weinstein terms
it, rather than engaging in "loophole lawyering." 15 For instance, the settlement requires Kaye Scholer to disclose any material facts relating to a
banking matter where Kaye Scholer has determined that the facts are not
relevant to Kaye Scholer's theory of applicable law but where Kaye Scholer
knows that the banking agency may have a different view of the law. 151 As
another example,
Kaye Scholer shall not act as counsel for an insured depository institution client concerning a matter in which a Kaye Scholer attorney
knows that one or more of the institution's officers or employees is
... violating any applicable federal banking statutes or regulations,
including by attempting to evade any such statutes or regulations by
elevating form over substance. 152
Although Kaye Scholer settled the case, it vigorously denied OTS's
allegations. Kaye Scholer's counsel, Bernard Nussbaum, maintained that
the firm was forced to settle because its banks had shut off its line of credit,
thereby preventing it from meeting its operating expenses. 153 Nussbaum
has also argued that Kaye Scholer could not expect to win since the administrative proceeding would have been held before OTS. 154 Kaye Scholer
has maintained throughout that it did nothing wrong. 155 It has repeatedly
argued that it was simply fulfilling its professional duty of loyalty to its
client. 156 Kaye Scholer has maintained that if it had disclosed the information that OTS sought, it would have violated its professional ethics obliga-

°

149. Id. para. 12(f).
150. Harris Weinstein, Issues of Professional Responsibility Arising from the Savings and Loan
Failure, Remarks Before the University of Michigan Law School (Mar. 24, 1992), in EMEROINO IssuES,
supra note 91, at 405, 415.
151. Settlement Order, supra note 145, para. 12(d).
152. Id. para. 15(c) (emphasis added).
153. DeBenedictis, supra note 127, at 60. Most commentators have accepted Nussbaum's
contention. See, e.g., id. at 60; Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, The Banking Scandal: An Era of
New Standards for Professionals?, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 23, 1992, at 1, 10.
154. See DeBenedictis, supra note 127, at 59; Kaye, Scholer and the New Ethics Imperative, s11pra
note 6, at 65-68; Bernard W. Nussbaum & Warren R. Stem, FIRREA's Grant of lnjrmctive and
Adjudicative Powers, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 24, 1992, at 1.
155. GILLERS & SIMoN, supra note 3, at 730. For Kaye Scholer's claim by claim response to
OTS's Notice of Charges, see id. at 772-78.
156. Id. at 778. Kaye Scholer was supported in this contention by ethics expert Geoffrey Hazard.
Professor Hazard submitted a sworn statement defending Kaye Scholer's conduct on the theory that the
firm was acting properly as litigation counsel. Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C. H!IZIIrd,
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tions. 157 According to Kaye Scholer, OTS brought suit simply because
Kaye Scholer advanced arguments on its client's behalf which it believed
were supported by the facts and law without going further and disclosing
weaknesses in its client's position or contrary arguments available to
OTS. 158 The bottom line, says Kaye Scholer (and others), is that OTS is
trying to redefine the role of a lawyer. 159
III
THE TRADmONAL RoLE OF THE LAWYER

In order to determine whether OTS regulations and procedures do
redefine the role of the lawyer, we need to examine the lawyer's traditional
role. In the United States, our adversarial model of adjudication defines
this role. 160 The adversary system typically pits two contestants-or more
precisely, their representatives-against each other to argue their cases
before a neutral and largely passive judge. 161 The parties control the investigation and presentation of evidence and argument. 162 For the most part,
then, the parties designate the proofs and run the process. 163 Party control
is said to preserve individual autonomy and dignity because it gives litigants the "fullest voice possible" in their cases. 164 Similarly, party control
is believed to affirm human individuality by mandating respect for the opinions of each party, rather than the opinions of the "attorney, of the court, or
of society at large." 165
Jr. (Feb. 25, 1992), reprinted in THE ArroRNEY-Ct.IENr RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, ScHOLER, supra
note 6, at 381, 394-402.
157. Edward A. Adams, Repercussions of Kaye Scholer Suit Discussed by Ethics Experts, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 23, 1992, at 1, 2.
158. GILLERS & SIMoN, supra note 3, at 773.
159. See id. at 778.
160. ''The term [adversary system] has no fiXed and precise meaning .... [yet] it is a useful term
for identifying a distinctive set of features and style of decisionmaking that is most fully developed in
Anglo-American legal systems ...." Malcolm Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TilE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 753, 753 (Robert J. Janosik ed., 1987).
161. ld.
162. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 641No. LJ. 301,
302 (1989); see also STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 4
(1984) ("[T]he parties are responsible for producing all the evidence upon which the decision will be
based."); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusncE: AN ETIIICAL STIJDY 57 (1988) (noting that the
adversary system assigns the parties responsibility for presenting their own cases and challenging their
opponents'); CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MoDERN LEGAL ETI!Ics 564 (1986) (''The parties initiate and
control the definition of the issues and the presentation of evidence.'').
The adversary system of adjudication is frequently contrasted with its continental European
counterpart, the inquisitorial system, on precisely this point. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra, at 93-94; Feeley,
supra note 160, at 754. Judges in inquisitorial systems typically take a more active role in investigating
and questioning, while the parties are left with a correspondingly diminished role. LUBAN, supra, at 94.
163. LANDSMAN, supra note 162, at 44.
164. Sward, supra note 162, at 318.
165. LANDSMAN, supra note 162, at 46. According to Landsman, party control "provides the
litigant a neutral forum in which to air his views and promises that those views will be- heard and
considered." ld.
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The adversary system requires that the lawyer's role be focused and
limited. 166 The lawyer is expected to be fiercely partisan in order to ensure
the sharp adversarial contest that is central to the adversary system. 167 The
lawyer's over-arching professional duty is to represent his client's interests
zealously. 168 The lawyer's goal is not to determine the truth but to win. 169
The following sections examine two important aspects of the lawyer's role
that became relevant in the Kaye Scholer litigation.

A.

Partisan Presentation of Evidence

It is up to the lawyer to present the client's evidence to the tribunal.
Lawyers in the adversary system, however, do not merely gather evidence
and organize it logically or objectively. 170 Rather, the lawyer is the client's
zealous advocate, and therefore must search for the "best'' evidence from
the client's point of view and present it in the way most likely to advance
the client's ends. 171 At the same time, the lawyer must challenge the oppo166. See LANDSMAN, supra note 162, at 45-46 ("According to adversary theory, when each actor
performs only a single function, the dispute before the court will be resolved in the fairest and most
efficient way.").
The lawyer's specific obligations derive in large part from the legal ethics codes that regulate the
profession. Each state has its own ethics rules, but all of the states except California have adopted 11
variant of one of the: two model codes promulgated by the Ame:rican Bar Association. LUBAN, supra
note 162, at xxvii. Accordingly, I will rely primarily on the ABA's two model code:s. The older code: is
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, first adopted in 1969 and revised several times since,
The more recent code is the: Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983.
167. Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and
Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 487, 495 & n.32
(1980); see also William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wts. L. REv. 29, 36.
168. See MoDEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-lOl(A), EC 7-1 (1980); see also
MoDEL RULES OF PRoFESSIONAL CoNOucr Rule 1.3 emt. (1983) (encouraging counsel to "act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the elient's
behalf').
169. Feeley, supra note 160, at 753. That is not to say, however, that the: system is not concerned
with truth. Indeed, defende:rs of the adversary system maintain that the lawyer's sharply defined,
partisan role encourages the kind of thorough investigation likely to bring out the truth. See MoNRoB H.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3 (1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHics] ("the adversary system is one of the most efficient and fair methods designed for determining"
the truth); LUBAN, supra note 162, at 68-74; Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1469, 1470 (1966)
[hereinafter Freedman, The Three Hardest Questions] ('The attorney functions in an adversary system
based upon the presupposition that the most effective means of determining truth is to present to a judge
and jury a clash between proponents of conflicting views."); Sward, supra note 162, at 316-17. But see
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REv. 647, 653-54
(1986) (claiming that certain "examples should sufficiently demonstrate: to anyone with a sense of reality
that the adve:rsary system that Americans have chosen .•. is not based on a search for the: truth").
170. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 35,36 (Harold J. Berman
ed., rev. ed. 1971).
171. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNOucr Rule 3.3 cmt. (1983) ('The: advocate's task is to
present the client's case with persuasive force."). As Professor Fuller put it, the lawyer "is not like a
jeweler who slowly turns a diamond in the: tight so that each of its facets may in turn be fully revealed.
Instead the: advocate holds the: je:wel steadily, as it were, so as to throw into bold relief a single aspect of
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nent's position' as vigorously as possible. 172 The lawyer, then, takes the
available facts and molds them into the most plausible; advantageous legal
theories possible. 173 Although lawyers are not permitted to lie, they generally have no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant
facts. 174
The lawyer's duty to present the client's evidence partisanly is thought
to be vitally important to the adversary systemP5 In the criminal context
the lawyer's partisan presentation of evidence is seen as giving voice to the
defendant's interests in opposition to the state. 176 Moreover, it is believed
that the factfinder is better able to render an appropriate decision "after
listening to the arguments of two vigorous and fiercely partisan advocates."177 If one advocate is not sufficiently zealous, then the factfinder
may not have adequate evidence upon which to base her decision. The
factfinder might, then, be tempted to engage in an independent investigation
which would endanger her neutrality.
B.

Duty of Confidentiality

The duty to represent the client zealously implies that the lawyer owes
the client a duty of loyalty. One important way that lawyers manifest their
loyalty is by keeping their clients' confidences. The scope of the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality varies slightly under the different ethical codes.
The American Bar Association's (ABA's) most recent ethics code, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), adopts a strict position. Model Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer cannot reveal information relating
to the representation of a client without the client's consent unless it is to
defend the lawyer against charges of wrongdoing or to prevent the client
from committing a crime that "the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." 178 Moreover, these narrow
it." Fuller, supra note 170, at 35-36; see also Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Report of the Joint
Conference of the ABA and Ml.S on Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958) (''The
lawyer appearing as an advocate before a tribunal presents, as persuasively as he can, the facts and the
law of the case as seen from the standpoint of his client's interest").
172. Feeley, supra note 160, at 753.
173. See MoDEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmiLITY EC 7-23 (1980) (''The adversary system
contemplates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the light most favorable to his
client"). For an interesting discussion of the criminal defense lawyer's duty to present evidence
partisanly, see Freedman, The Three Hardest Questions, supra note 169. Professor Freedman argues
that the criminal defense lawyer is required by his role in the adversary system to put perjurious clients
on the stand and to discredit opposing witnesses known by the lawyer to be telling the truth, even if it
means humiliating them. /d. at 1474-78.
174. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 4.1 cmt. (1983).
175. "In a very real sense it may be said that the integrity of the adjudicative process itself depends
upon the participation of the advocate." Fuller & Randall, supra note 171, at.1160.
176. See LUBAN, supra note 162, at 60.
177. Feeley, supra note 160, at 753-54; see also MoDEL CoDE OF PRoFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLITY
EC 7-19, EC 7-23 (1980); Fuller & Randall, supra note 171, at 1160-61.
178. MoDEL RULES OF PRoFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 (1983).
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exceptions to the duty of confidentiality are merely permissive; lawyers are
never required to reveal confidences.
Model Rule 1.6, then, seemingly does not permit a lawyer to disclose
information about client fraud. However, the comment to Rule 1.6 does
permit a lawyer to withdraw from representation if the client will use the
lawyer's services in materially furthering a crime or fraud. 179 The comment
goes on to say that the lawyer may give notice of withdrawal and may
withdraw any opinion, affirmation, or document. Some commentators
maintain that permitting such "noisy" withdrawals amounts to permitting
disclosure, if not of the facts of the fraud, at least of the fact that something
is not quite rigllt. 180 That view is likely correct, but then Rule 1.6 may be
said to demonstrate the reverence that the duty of confidentiality
commands. 181
Many states have not adopted the Model Rules but have instead
retained the ABA's older ethics code, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code). The Model Code's general confidentiality
rule prohibits lawyers from revealing client confidences; 182 however, an
exception to the confidentiality rule permits disclosure of a client's "intention . . . to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime." 183 But like the Model Rules, the Model Code's exception to confidentiality is discretionary, not mandatory.
The Model Code addresses past client fraud in a different provision.
DR 7-102(B)(l) provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that . . .
[h]is client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when

the information is protected as a privileged communication. 184
The ABA Standing Committee on Discipline and Professional Ethics has
interpreted the term "privileged communication" broadly to refer not just to
information protected by the evidentiary attorney-client privilege but to all
179. See also id. Rule 1.16(b) (permitting withdrawal if "the client persists in a course of action
involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent").
180. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY LJ. 271, 298-303 (1984); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal
and the New Model of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L.
REv. 455, 478-84 (1984).
181. See Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their
Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075, 1099-100 (1993) ("[T]he comment's insistence on signs communicates
that silence is right and disclosure is wrong.").
182. MoDEL CoDE oF PRoFESSIONAL REsPONSmiLITY DR 4-101(B) (1980).
183. /d. DR 4-101(C)(3).
184. /d. DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis added).
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infonnation covered by the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. 185 In practice,
then, this exception swallows the disclosure requirement because infonnation revealing a client's fraud almost always comes within the tenn "privileged communication." Thus, the clause has been construed to negate the
lawyer's duty to rectify client fraud committed in the course of
representation. 186
Although the Model Rules and the Model Code differ in their treatment of confidentiality, 187 the theory underlying both is the same. Lawyers
owe their clients a duty of loyalty, and revealing client confidences is disloyal. Confidentiality is seen as a vital component of both the lawyer-client
relationship and the adversary system as a whole. 188 It is feared that if
lawyers were not bound by a duty of confidentiality, then clients would be
less likely to seek timely legal assistance and less likely to provide their
lawyers with complete infonnation. 189 Full and frank communication is
thought to enable lawyers to assist their clients in conforming with the

185. Under the Model Code, the duty of confidentiality extends to all "information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would
be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." ld. DR 4-101(A).
186. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975); New
Y()rk State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 454 (1976). Moreover, even in the
exceedingly rare instances when the information is not gained through a privileged communication, the
information must "clearly establish" that the client's conduct is fraudulent before the lawyer is obliged
to disclose it.
DR 7-102(B)(1) as originally promulgated did not include the exception for privileged
communications; the ABA added the exception in 1974. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SusAN P.
KoNJAK, THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING 283-84 (1990). Many states have not adopted the
amendment, see id. at 284, but New York did. N.Y. Juo. LAw Code of Professional Responsibility DR
7-102(B)(1) (McKinney 1992).
187. As a practical matter, lawyer conduct under the two codes may vary little. Perhaps, the
biggest difference in the codes' treatment of confidentiality is that the Model Code allows lawyers to
reveal a client's intention to commit a crime whereas the Model Rules prohibit lawyers from disclosing
such an intention unless the crime "is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." But
since both exceptions are discretionary, a lawyer who does not reveal any information would be
behaving ethically under either code.
188. " 'rr:Jhe interests served by the strict rule of confidentiality are far broader than merely those
of the client, but include the interests of the public generally and of effective judicial administration.' "
New York State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 562 (1984) (quoting New York
State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. No. 479 (1978)).
189. See id.; FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 169, at5 ("Obviously, ... the client cannot
be expected to reveal to the lawyer all information that is potentially relevant ... unless the client can be
assured that the lawyer will maintain all such information in the strictest confidence.'').
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law. 190 In addition, confidentiality is believed to preserve the client's
autonomy 191 and constitutional rights. 192
IV
THE CoNTRAsT BETWEEN THE LAWYER's RoLE IN THE OTS
SYSTEM AND IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

The description in Part ill of the traditional role of the lawyer as
defined by the adversary system indicates a tension between the disclosure
obligations that OTS sought to impose on Kaye Scholer and the ethical
rules that govern the profession. Of course, any comparison between the
two sets of obligations in the context of the Kaye Scholer case is problematic for a number of reasons. First, OTS's claims against Kaye Scholer
were not litigated. Kaye Scholer riever admitted to any wrongdoing and in
fact sharply cqntested many of OTS's factual allegations. 193 Second,
because the claims were not litigated we have no determinative ruling as to
the meaning and scope of certain key regulations. 194 Finally, the professional ethics standards are not always precise and well-defined. Nor is
there a uniform system of ethics rules across the country; some states have
adopted the Model Rules while others have retained the Model Code, 195 and
190. Or put another way, if clients communicate freely with lawyers, then lawyers will be able to
dissuade clien~ from engaging in wrongful conduct But see Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego:
Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Hann, 70 IowA L. REv. 1091, 1166 (1985) (criticizing this
argument).
191. There are a number of ways to construct n relationship between lawyer confidentiality and
client autonomy. Lawyer confidentiality is most commonly viewed as an instrumental means of
enhancing the client's autonomy. Professor Subin describes this argument as the classic defense of
confidentiality:
(a) the primary objective of the legal system is the preservation of individual autonomy,
through the protection of an individual's rights against encroachments by other individuals or
the state; (b) in a complex society individuals can have meaningful access to the legal system
... only if they are represented by attorneys who have the skill to guide them through the
process; (c) attorneys can perform this function only if they are privy to all the client's
information, because otherwise they would not be able to diagnose properly the legnl problem
or prescribe a ~olution of it; (d) clients will not provide attorneys with all of the facts,
including possibly damaging and embarrassing facts, if they believe that the attorney will
disclose those facts; (e) therefore, confidentiality is essential to the preservation of individual
autonomy.
Id. at 1160. See also Simon, supra note 167, at 42 (confidentiality reflects fact that the lawyer is an
extension of the client's will; the client can use the lawyer as a tool to "invoke his rights and maximize
his autonomy").
Part V ilifradevelops a different vision of the relationship between autonomy and the lawyer's role,
including the lawyer's duty of confidentiality.
192. "The rule also plays an important role in preserving a client's constitutionally protected (a)
right to effective representation by counsel in criminal cases and (b) privilege against selfincrimination." New York State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 562 (1984); see
also FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' Ennes, supra note 169, at 8.
193. See, e.g., Gn.LERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 774 (n Kaye Scholer response, denying that it
knew that Arthur Andersen lied in a SEC filing).
194. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1020 ("Further clouding the debate are underlying disagreements
as to the substantive law governing sueh financial intermediaries as Lincoln Savings.").
195. And California adopted neither. LUB'AN, supra note 162, at xxvii.

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 688 1994

1994]

UNDERSTANDING KAYE SCHOLER

689

many have amended the set they chos~. 196 Nonetheless, a general comparison is possible. As mentioned above, this -Comment will focus on OTS's
claim that Kaye Scholer was obliged to disclose certain material facts to
OTS.
The ethics rules prohibit lawyers from making false statements of
material facts, but lawyers are otherwise under no general obligation to volunteer facts to an opposing party. 197 In contrast, OTS relied on 12 C.P.R.
§ 563.180(b) to impose just such an obligation on.Kaye Scholer. 198 An
obligation to volunteer material facts is problematic in light of the lawyer's
duty of partisan presentation of evidence, the rule of confidentiality, and the
ideal of rigidly separate roles that is implicit in adversarial theory.
The adversary system assumes that each party will normally present
only the evidence that supports his or her claim. OTS, however, expected
Kaye Scholer to volunteer evidence that would weaken Lincoln's claim.
For instance, OTS claimed that Kaye Scholer violated OTS regulations
because it knew but failed to disclose facts suggesting that certain transactions should be classified as joint ventures rather than loans. 199 Kaye
Scholer maintained that it properly relied on Lincoln's accountants who had
classified the transactions as loans; therefore, it believed that it had a firm
basis for advocating that classification.200 Similarly, the Settlement Order
highlights the conflict between OTS's expectations and the lawyer's duty to
present evidence partisanly. The Settlement Order requires Kaye Scholer to
disclose any material facts relating to a banking matter where Kaye Scholer
has determined that the facts are not relevant to Kaye Scholer's theory of
applicable law and regulations but where Kaye Scholer knows that the
01
banking agency may have a different
. view of the law and regulations.Z.
196. See liAZARo & KONIAK, supra note 186, at 292 (chart of state variations to Model Rule 1.6).
197. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 & cmt {1983).
198. As noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 141-143, OTS justified charging Kaye
Scholer with violating 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(bX1) on the ground that by interposing itself between
Lincoln and OTS, Kaye Scholer acted as Lincoln's agent rather than merely as ·Lincoln's lawyer. OTS's
distinction between lawyer and agent is problematic for anumber of reasons. First, OTS has established
no guidelines for determining at what moment a lawyer steps into the role of agent. Second, the basis
for the distinction itself is arguably contrary to adversarial procedure. As a general proposition, once a
party has retained counsel, the opponent's counsel is required to deal solely with that party's lawyer.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSffiiLITY DR 7-102 (1980). Third, the distinction is likely
irrelevant; if it chooses, OTS can impose the same obligations on law firms who do not "interpose"
themselves between the regulators and the institution. As noted above, see supra text accompanying
notes 48-50, OTS has enforcement powers over institution-affiliated parties-a class that includes
lawyers. Finally, it may be impossible for a lawyer to fulfill his duty of zealous representation without
falling into the role of "agent," as OTS defmes it
199. Notice of Charges, supra note 117, paras. 107-22.•
200. See GJLLERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 773, 776-77.
201. Settlement Order, supra note 145, para. 12(e). Of course the Settlement Order is not law. It
also may not be the agency's articulation of how all firms should conduct their practices. For one thing,
the language of the Settlement Order is substantially similar to the language in the OTS Temporary
Cease and Desist Order. Nonetheless, the Order does represent OTS's view of how Kaye Scholer

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 689 1994

690

CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:663

According to the professional ethics rules, Kaye Scholer had an obligation to present the evidence in the light most favorable to Lincoln. Thus, in
the loan/joint venture example, Kaye Scholer's conduct would seem to be
acceptable, and perhaps even obligatory. OTS's theory seems to be that,
instead of being obligated to present the evidence partisanly, lawyers are to
share the facts with the agency so that the agency can come to the "proper"
decision. While there is nothing illogical about establishing an adjudicatory
system in which the parties are under an obligation to volunteer all the
evidence to their opponents and to the tribunal, 202 that is not the adversary
system.
OTS's claims are also in tension with the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. Using the same example, both the Model Rules and the Model Code
would likely prohibit a lawyer from disclosing the facts OTS sought. The
Model Rules prohibit lawyers from disclosing client confidences unless the
lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent the client
from committing a c~me likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm. No violent crime was threatened here, so the Model Rules
would require Kaye Scholer to keep mum. Similarly, none of the Model
Code's exceptions to confidentiality would fit the facts of this case.203 Furthermore, the permissive exceptions to the duty of confidentiality would not
even be implicated unless Kaye Scholer reasonably believed that Lincoln
was acting illegally; Kaye Scholer, however, claimed that a creditable argument could be made in favor of Lincoln's position. Thus, according to the
current ethics rules, Kaye Scholer almost certainly had no obligation to volunteer the information and likely had an obligation not to disclose it.
Finally, a duty to volunteer adverse information violates principles of
rigid role separation. Adversarial theory suggests that the advocate's role
must be sharply defined and have a single purpose in order to be effective.
A lawyer cannot be a zealous advocate, eagerly serving the client's interests, if every time he says anything to OTS he has to hand over all relevant
adverse facts so that OTS can make an informed, "accurate" decision.
In summary, the duty to volunteer adverse information is in tension
with the most fundamental aspect of the adversary system: the adversarial
nature of the litigation. The OTS system replaces the battle model of adjushould conduct its practice, and other frrms in similar positions would be foolish not to consider it when
deciding how to represent clients before OTS.
202. An inquisitorial model of adjudication might be considered such a system. In Germany, for
example, the civil procedure code requires parties to make "complete" (vollstlindig) statements
regarding the factual circumstances underlying the case. ZrviLPROZESSORDNUNo § 138(1) (F.R.G.).
This is understood to require that adverse facts be volunteered. See, e.g., 1 MONCHBNBR KoMMBNTAR
ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNO 992 (Gerhard LUke & Alfred WalchshOfer eds., 1992) (collecting
authorities).
203. If, in this example, Lincoln were threatening criminal conduct, then the Model Code would
permit but not require Kaye Scholer to disclose the information. See supra note 183 and accompanying
text
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dication with a cooperative model; the lawyer is to work with the agency to
advance a common goal.
This Part has concluded that OTS sought to impose obligations on
Kaye Scholer that are in tension with the lawyer's traditional obligations.
And most commentators have framed the Kaye Scholer controversy in just
these terms; they have examined OTS' s actions and Kaye Scholer's
responses in light of the traditional role of the lawyer. 204 The Kaye Scholer
case does implicate the lawyer's professional role, as this Part amply demonstrates; however, it is the thesis of this Comment that the conflict surrounding that professional role points to a more fundamental conflict: a
conflict about what it means to be a citizen. The following Part considers
the concept of the citizen embodied in our democratic form of government
and relates that concept to the adversary system of adjudication. Part VI
then examines an alternative model of the regulated person that underlies
the OTS system.

v
THE

ADVERSARY SYSTEM's CONCEPTION OF

THE

CITIZEN

The tension, described above, between the role of the lawyer as
defined by the adversary system and that conceived by OTS reflects more
fundamentally the two systems' different visions of the citizen and the citizen's relationship with the state. Our traditional concept of the citizen
grows out of our democratic form of government. One way of understanding the central values that underlie a democratic government is by contrasting democracy with autocracy. 205 Under this view, the difference between
democracy and autocracy rests on the distinction between autonomy and
heteronomy:
democratic forms of government are those in which the laws are
made by the same people to whom they apply (and for that reason
they are autonomous norms), while in autocratic forms of government the law-makers are different from those to whom the laws are
addressed (and are therefore heteronomous norms). 206
204. See, e.g., G!LLERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 729-31; Brickman, supra note 6; Dennis E.
Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit
of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 985, 985-1002 (1993); Jackson, supra note 2, at 1025-32; Peter C.
Kostant, When Zeal Boils Over: Disclosure Obligations and the Duty of Candor of Legal Counsel in
Regulatory Proceedings after the Kaye Scholer Settlement, 25 ARiz. ST. LJ. 487 (1993); Podgers, supra
note 6.
205. See HANs KasEN, GENERAL THEORY oF LAw AND STATE 283-84 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1946) (criticizing as "superficial" the traditional classification which distinguishes between monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy based on the number of people in whom power rests and proposing as more
"correct" a distinction between autocracy and democracy "based on the idea of political freedom").
206. NoRBERTO Bossro, DEMOCRACY AND DrcrATORSIDP: THE NATURE AND LIMITs OF STATE
PoWER 137 (Peter Kennealy trans., 1989); see also CARL CoHEN, DEMOCRACY 268-70 (1971)
(describing democracy as an autonomous, rather than heteronomous, form of government); H.B. MAYo,
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This distinction between autonomy and heteronomy highlights self-determination as a fundamental value embodied in democracy. 207 In democracies,
citizens are self-determining because they live under the laws of their own
choosing.208 "[L]aws and rules imposed by an outsider would violate the
self-determination of all those subject to the laws."209
Basic to this understanding of democracy, with its emphasis on the
value of self-determination, is the notion that the citizens who comprise a
democracy are autonomous. 210 We cannot speak of citizens living under
law of their own choosing unless we assume that these citizens are free to
make such choices.211 For this reason, Professor Post concludes that "[t]he
ascription of autonomy is ... the transcendental precondition for the possibility of democratic self-determination."212 As he puts it, "democracy conceives its citizens . . . as free and independent persons capable and
determined to decide their own destiny."213 Not surprisingly, then, this
conception of the autonomous citizen underlies several provisions of the
United States Constitution.214 Indeed, Professor Richards observes that
AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 94 (1960) (in democracies the "[a]uthority to make
decisions binding on the citizens is located in the body of citizens and not elsewhere").
207. KELSEN, supra note 205, at 284-86.
208. RoBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND rrs CRmcs 89 (1989). Dahl notes:
The most celebrated exposition of this argument is to be found in the Social Contract; indeed
in that work Rousseau explicitly set out to "find a form of association that defends and
protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of
which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as
before."
ld. (quoting JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAU, ON THE SociAL CoNTRAcr, WITH THE GENEVA MANUSCRIPT AND
PoLmCAL EcoNOMY 53 (Roger D. Masters & Judith R. Masters eds., 1978) (1762)).
It has been argued, however, that democratic governments cannot be justified on the basis of selfdetermination because the losing minority in any given contest does not live under the laws of its own
choosing. For different approaches and responses to this difficulty, see id. at 89-90; CAROL C. GoULD,
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION IN PoLmCS, EcoNOMY, AND SOCIETY
228-46 (1988); KEITH GRAHAM, THE BATILE OF DEMOCRACY: CONFL!cr, CONSENSUS AND THE
INDNIDUAL 75-93 (1986); WILLIAM N. NasoN, ON JuSTIFYING DEMocRACY 62-65 (1980); Robert C.
Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social Fonn, in DEMOCRATIC
CoMMUNITY, NOMOS XXXV 163, 169-72 (John W. Chapman & Jan Shapiro eds., 1993).
209. DAHL, supra note 208, at 108.
210. /d. at 105 ("That personal autonomy and thus inclusion as a full citizen in a democratic order
are necessary to self-determination is even more obvious."); GRAHAM, supra note 208, at 33; Post,
supra note 208, at 174 ("[D]emocracy posits persons with autonomous selves."); see also CoHEN,
supra note 206, at 270 ("[T]hc autonomous character of democratic government is its most fundamental
and perhaps most important feature.").
211. DAHL, supra note 208, at 105. '"The word 'autonomy' is obviously derived from the Greek
stems for 'self and 'law' or 'rule,' and means literally 'the having or making of one's own laws.' " Joel
Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL 27, 27 (John Christman ed., 1989).
212. Robert Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS
654, 672 (I993); see also David AJ. Richards, Autonomy in Law, in THE INNER CITADEL supra note
211, at 246, 246 ("Autonomy is, I believe, a constitutive normative ingredient of American democratic
constitutionalism because it specifies the empirical and normative conditions for the value of selfgovernment essential to the very legitimacy of this form of government.").
213. Post, supra note 212, at 665 n.44.
214. See infra notes 228-39; see also Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral
Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 445, 446 (1983) (observing that the Supreme Court
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"[a]utonomy ... plays the role that it does in American constitutional law
because it specifies the normative value of self-government that is the ultimate aim that the constitutional design ... serves."215
The close relationship between democracy and citizen autonomy has
been widely discussed. What has not been adequately attended to, however, is that this democratic conception of the autonomous citizen is also
embodied in our adversary system of adjudication. This model of the citizen is most apparent in criminal adjudication, where the citizen's relationship with the state is most clearly at issue, so I will begin my discussion
with the adversary system in the criminal context. I will then examine civil
litigation and suggest that although it is oriented toward the goal of efficient
administration of justice and is willing to manipulate the citizen's role to
achieve that end, the role of the citizen reflected in civil litigation mirrors in
its general contours that of the autonomous citizen in criminallitigation.216
Criminal adjudication is structured so as to prevent the government
from using citizens solely as tools for furthering the government's goals.
Although the government's goal of punishing those who fail to conform
their behavior to the substantive criminal law is undoubtedly legitimate and
desirable, criminal adjudication is nonetheless characterized by constitutional guarantees and structural features that are designed to frustrate the
efficient attainment of that goal. 217 These impediments can be seen as
aimed at limiting the state's power over citizens; by doing so, they reflect
the citizen's autonomous and distinct role vis-a-vis the state.218
One such impediment is the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination. The privilege has been interpreted broadly to apply in a variety of settings.219 For instance, a defendant has the "unfettered right to sit
has found the concept of personal autonomy or self-determination "lurking in various shadowy crevices
of the Bill of Rights"); Richards, supra note 212, at 246 ("[A]utonomy in American constitutional law
connects to a larger moral and political conception of self-governing agents .•.."). See generally
Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REv. 175 (1982).
215. Richards, supra note 212, at 251.
216. Although OTS suits are nominally civil, the appropriateness of that characterization is open to
question. See infra text accompanying notes 343-48.
217. The Anglo-American adversary system has
erected a variety of barriers to prosecution and surrounded the criminally accused with a host
of legal protections [including] the standard of proof in criminal cases, the presumption of
innocence, the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, the right to silence, exclusionary rules, and the right to counsel.
Feeley, supra note 160, at 756.
218. See ROGERS M. SMITH, LmERAUSM AND AMERICAN CoNSTITUilONAL LAW 14 (1985)
("[G]overnment should be limited so as to free individuals to undertake private as well as public
pursuits of happiness, even if this option erodes public spiritedness in practice.").
219. "[T]here is no 'the' privilege. It is many things in as many settings." 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE,
EviDENCE § 2251, at 296 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 461 (1966) (''In this Court, the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal
construction.").
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silent throughout the course of a criminal trial."220 The prosecution is not
permitted even to call the defendant to the stand.221 A person accused of a
crime may also remain silent while in custody prior to trial. 222 Moreover,
witnesses may refuse to disclose self-incriminating information in civil
cases,223 and before grand juries,224 legislative committees,225 and administrative tribunals.226 Finally, the privilege protects not only evidence that in
itself would support a conviction but evidence that would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute. 227
By shielding the citizen from nonconsensual interrogation, this wideranging privilege frustrates the government's legitimate interest in acquiring information about criminal activities. In this way, the privilege reflects
our democratic ascription of citizen autonomy. The privilege acknowledges
that citizens exist in a private realm and have private interests and objec~
tives.228 Indeed, the Supreme Court has justified the privilege in just these
terms, proclaiming in Miranda v. Arizona:
[W]e may view the historical development of the privilege as one
which groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the
citizen. As a "noble principle often transcends its origins," the privilege has come rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's
substantive right, a "right to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy.'' 229
Similarly, in United States v. Wade, 230 the Court stated that "[t]he privilege
historically goes to the roots of democratic and religious principle. . . . The
roots of the privilege ... go to the nature of a free man and to his relation~
ship to the state.''231
220. Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, The Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination,
16 WM. MITcHELL L. REv. 249, 264 (1990).
221. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (characterizing the defendant's refusal to
take the stand as a "constitutional privilege" and holding that a prosecutor may not invite the jury to
draw any adverse inference from it).
222. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
223. McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34,40 (1924).
224. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892).
225. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1957).
226. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); id. at 336-37 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 34546 (Black, J., dissenting).
227. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
228. See Smith, supra note 214, at 191; see also Charles Fried, Privacy, 11 YALE L.J. 475, 488
(1968) (the privilege against self-incrimination is an "example of a contingent, symbolic recognition of
an area of privacy as an expression of respect for personal integrity''); Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy and
Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87, 93 (1970) (compelling self-incriminating statements is inconsistent
with the belief that citizens are free agents).
229. 384 U.S. 436,460 (1966) (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,579, 581-82 (2d
Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
230. 388 u.s. 218 (1967).
231. /d. at 261 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Expressions are legion in
opinions of this Court that the protection of personal privaey is a central purpose of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. . . • The privilege reflects 'our respect for the inviolability of the human
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The Fourth Amendment can be viewed as expressing a similar conception of the citizen.232 Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment is interpreted as requiring the government to secure a warrant supported by
probable cause before conducting a search.233 In limited circumstances, the
Court has approved searches without warrants; 234 however, even warrantless searches must normally be supported by probable cause.235 The probable cause requirement is intended ''to safeguard citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of
crime."236 Like the privilege against self-incrimination, then, the warrant
and probable cause requirements reflect the citizen's right to a private
realm. 237 Even though the state has a legitimate interest in obtaining evidence of crime, the state ordinarily cannot simply intrude into a citizen's
realm; it must have special justification to do so, in the form of a warrant or
probable cause.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the very fact that criminal litigation is fiercely adversarial reflects the system's respect for the citizen's
autonomy vis-a-vis the state. The adversary system envisions a pitched battle between equals to be decided by an independent, neutral and passive
decisionmaker. 238 The state does not hold a privileged position in litigapersonality •.. .' " Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)); see also Tehan v. United
States ex rei. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (stating that privilege reflects ''the concern of our society
for the right of each individual to be let alone"); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976)
(describing the privilege against self-incrimination as protecting privacy).
232. See Tehan, 382 U.S. at 416 (observing that the Fourth Amendment is like the Fifth
Amendment in that it reflects society's concern with the right of the individual to be left alone); see also
Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 193, 211 (noting that
the Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure and the privilege against
self-incrimination "reinforee each other in the interest of privacy protection").
233. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,586 (1980); United States v. United States District Court,
407
297, 315-16 (1972).
234. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-22 (1987) (search of government employee's
office by supervisor); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (search of student's purse by
public school officials).
235. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
236. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
237. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (''ff]he principal object of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of privacy ...."); id. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment
"creates a zone of privacy that may not be invaded by the police").
238. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 Omo ST.
LJ. 713, 714 (1983). The Constitution of Massachusetts provides that "[i]t is the right of every citizen
to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit" MAss.
CoNST. pt. I, art. XXIX, quoted in Fuller, supra note 170, at 35.
·
The Due Process Clause guarantees impartial treatment in adjudicatory proceedings. See Judith K.
Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D.
L. REv. 551 (1991). To this end, adversarial theory insists on keeping separate the functions of the
advocate and the decisionmaker. Fuller, supra note 170, at 34. The decisionmaker must withhold
judgment "until all the evidence has been examined and all the arguments have been heard." I d. at 35.
"Adversary theory suggests that if the decision maker strays from the passive role, he runs a serious risk
of prematurely committing himself to one or another version of the facts and of failing to appreciate the

u.s.
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tion; the state's objectives, legitimate and desirable though they may be, do
not automatically define the nature, or control the result, of the inquiry.
Rather, the adversary system places the state in the role of a private actor.
Both the state and the citizen have the opportunity to present their best
evidence before the tribunal.
These structural features and constitutional guarantees suggest that
although the state may seek to advance legitimate objectives, the state can
only go so far and can only use certain means. The adversary system in the
criminal context establi~hes citizens as autonomous and separate from the
state. They cannot be used solely as tools to advance the state's goals;
rather, their private interests and objectives must be acknowledged and considered. In this way the adversary system reflects the democratic premise
"of independent citizens who desire to' fashion their social order in a manner that reflects their values and commitments."239
Thinking about the adversary system in this way helps us better to
understand the role of the lawyer that the system gives rise to. The adversary ~ystem is structured so as to constitute autonomous citizens, and the
traditional role of the lawyer, as c,lescribed in Part m, is an essential element
of that structure. The adversary system contemplates autonomous litigants
who marshal their evidence and present their facts in the way most likely to
advance their independent interests and objectives. In keeping with that
assumption, the adversary system constructs advocates who are bound to be
loyal: advocates who give voice to the citizen's interests against the state.
Thus, it is only fitting that while the lawyer cannot lie, he is under no obligation to volunteer adverse information to his client's opponent.240 In this
way we can see the lawyer's role, like the system that defines it, as founded
on the presumption of citizen autonomy.
Note that my position should not be mistaken for related arguments
that defend the lawyer's traditional role in the adversary system on the
ground that it maximizes the client's autonomy. Professor Stephen Pepper
provides an example of such an argument 241 Professor Pepper argues that
in our highly legalized society, autonomy is often dependent on access to
the law. 242 In such a society, access to law requires the assistance of a
value of all the evidence." LANDSMAN, supra note 162, at 2-3. Indeed, the history of the ndversnry
system is in large part the evolution in the role of the decisionmaker from interested pnrty to
disinterested, passive observer. Feeley, supra note 160, at 755. Early jurors were selected from Ute
locality in which the dispute arose and were often familiar with the events lending to the dispute.
Landsman, supra, at 722. Early judges were "agent[s] of the crown who actively mnde inquiries nnd
conducted proceedings in order to protect and promote the interests of the crown." Feeley, supra note
160, at 755. By the eighteenth century, however, juries were for the most part neutrnl and passive, and
judicial neutrality was achieved in the nineteenth century. Landsman, supra, at 731-32.
239. Post, supra note 208, at 173.
240. Mooa RULES OF PRoFESSIONAL CoNoucr Rule 4.1 cmt. (1983).
241. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 613.
242. /d. at 617.
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lawyer.243 • Thus, by providing access to the law, the lawyer is the means
through which the client can attain autonomy. 244 By' contrast, I am concerned with the antecedent question: what is the image of the citizen upon
which our legal system is based? Approaching the issue in this way leads
me to conclude that the adversary system presupposes autonomous citizens.
The lawyer's role is defined in the way that it is, not in order that we might
secure the litigant's autonomy, as Professor Pepper asserts, but because
from the outset we assume the litigant's autonomy.
Turning now to civil litigation, the model of the citizen looks somewhat different. While criminal adjudication functions to defme the citizen's
relationship with the state, civil litigation is oriented towards the goal of
administering justice between private parties.245 Much of the structure and
procedures of civil litigation attests to the system's willingness to manipulate litigants instrumentally in furtherance of that goal.246 For instance, the
stated purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to "secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."247 Accordingly,
the neutral, umpireal judge of criminal litigation is often replaced in civil
litigation by the managerial judge who is intent on resolving disputes efficiently.248 And in keeping with the goal of efficient adjudication, certain
243.

/d.

244. /d.
245. Cf. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
1325, 1325 (1991) ("The Constitution, statutes, and the common law all draw .fumhunental distinctions
between criminal proceedings, which emphasize adjudication of guilt or innocence with strict
adversarial protections for the accused, and civil proceedings, which emphasize the rights and
responsibilities of private parties.").
246. Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REv. 169,
202 ("[T]he judicial system, like any other government institution, needs to accomplish its goals .•..").
247. FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
248. Much has been written about the trend in civil litigation from passive judges to "managerial"
judges; that is, to judges who are actively involved in pretrial processing of civil cases. See, e.g.,
LANDSMAN, supra note 162, at 30-32; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1298 (1976); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306 (1986); Mare Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator
in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1986); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Judge's Role in Pretrial Case
Processing: Assessing the Need for Change, 66 JUDICATURE 28 (1982); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 770,770-73 (1981); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 IIARv. L. REv. 374 (1982); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 1 (1978);
see also Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 213 (U.S. 1983) (advisory
committee notes to rule 16) ("encourag[ing] forceful judicial management'' of the entire pretrial phase).
Professor Resnik describes the emergence of managerial judges as a reaction to the real or perceived
inefficiencies in the court system. Resnik, supra, at 395-402. For instance, managerial judges typically
seek to encourage and facilitate settlements. See Galanter, supra.
It has been said that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ''vindicated a: particular version of judicial
administration that sharply modified the preexisting adversary control over all aspects of litigation" and
"established on a secure footing the power of the judge as the manager of the case." Donald L.
Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DuKE
L.J. 1265, 1271.
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constitutional protections that impede the government's ability to pursue its
goals, like the self-incrimination clause, for example, do not apply in civil
litigation.249 Indeed, liberal discovery rules may require litigants to disclose to their opponents enormous amounts of information,250 much of
which is undoubtedly harmful to their interests.251 Moreover, the newly
amended Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure increases the
instrumental control over litigants in the name of efficiency.252 Rule
26(a)(l) now requires litigants automatically to disclose "certain basic
information" without the antecedent discovery requests required by the former version of that rule. 253
Certain duties of the lawyer in civil litigation also reflect the system's
increased concern with the efficient administration of justice. For instance,
Model Rule 3.3 prohibits lawyers in civil proceedings from bringing or
defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue therein,
unless there is a nonfrivolous basis for doing so, although it permits criminal defense lawyers to assert frivolous defenses in order "to require that
every element of the case be established."254 Moreover, the rules prohibiting a lawyer from presenting false evidence to a tribunal vary depending on
whether the proceedings are criminal or civil.255 Civil litigation's increased

249. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,430 (1956) (testimony may be compelled even if it
leads to "loss of job" and "general public opprobrium," as long as there is immunity from criminal
prosecution); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tad, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (adverse inference may
be drawn from silence in a civil proceeding); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19
(1976) (extending Tod to prison disciplinary proceedings).
250. The scope of the information that may be discovered is very broiul. Rule 26(b)(l) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits discovery of any information reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence and not protected by privilege.
251. Liberal discovery rules have been said to promote litigation efficiency. See Jeffrey J. Mayer,
Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 REv. Lmo. 77,87 (1992); see also Post, supra note 246, at
194-96 (maintaining that pretrial discovery is a regime of judicial administration, rather than
adjudication).
252. See Mayer, supra note 251, at 94 ("[D]isclosure would seem to mitigate the varied concerns
that cause discovery misuse and overuse.").
253. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 113 S. Ct. 475, 701·02 (interim cd.
1993) (advisory committee notes on Rule 26). This "basic information" includes all documents held by
a party "that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." Fl!o. R. CIV. P.
26(aXI)(B). Interestingly, the real or perceived "discovery crisis" which spawned the new Rule 26 has
also brought calls to eliminate discovery entirely. See Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1991, at 79, 81; Richard E. Moot, Consider Doing No Discovery, Lmo., Fall 1988, at 36.
254. MoDEL RULES oF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
255. ld. Rule 3.3 cmt. The comment states that "[e]xcept in the defense of a criminal accused, the
rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the
existence of the client's deception to the court or to the other party" (emphasis added). The comment
goes on to note that "[w]hether an advocate for a criminally accused has the same duty of disclosure [as
an advocate for a litigant in a civil suit] has been intensely debated,'' and then presents three possible
"resolutions" of the problem.
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concern with accurate, efficient adjudication is believed to justify placing
greater disclosure obligations on lawyers practicing in that realm. 256
On the other hand, although the above-mentioned features of civil litigation instrumentally manipulate the litigant's role in furtherance of the
system's goal of efficient dispute resolution, the role of the citizen reflected
in civil litigation mirrors, at least in its fundamental contours, the model of
citizen autonomy constituted by criminal litigation. Liberal discovery rules
notwithstanding, civil litigation is still highly adversarial. 257 Indeed, the
new Rule 26 has been almost universally condemned because it is seen as
diluting the adversarial nature of the proceedings and endangering the ideal
of zealous representation. 258 Accordingly, numerous federal districts have
256. Id. (although a disclosure of the client's deception to the court "can result in grave
consequences •.. the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting
the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement").
257. Indeed, the term "adversary system" is used to describe both civil and criminal adjudications
in the United States. See LUBAN, supra note 162, at xx (''The adversary system of justice ... lies at the
core of Anglo-American legal procedure ...."); Sward, supra note 162, at 301 (''The hallmark of
American adjudication is the adversary system").
The adversarial nature of civil litigation can be highlighted by contrasting our adversary system
with the inquisitorial system, the adjudicatory system prevalent in continental European countries such
as France, Germany, and Italy. The inquisitorial system can be seen as managed for a specific goal:
determining truth. See LANDSMAN, supra note 162, at 49 ("[T]he inquisitorial process is firmly
committed to the search for material truth."). Thus, the resources and the functions of the participants
are ordered to achieve this goal. For instance, judges in inquisitorial systems take a very active role in
seeking the truth. In a German criminal trial, the presiding judge "decides the sequenee of proof-taking
and conducts the bulk of the questioning of witnesses.••• [She] decides whether witnesses other than
those nominated by the parties should be called; in her hands also lies the decision whether to call expert
witnesses, and if so, the choice of experts." LUBAN, supra note 162, at 94.
The lawyer's role in inquisitorial systems is correspondingly diminished, and the professional
ethics rules in such systems serve further to neutralize partisanship and orient lawyers toward truthseeking. Legal ethics in inquisitorial systems principally define the lawyer's status as an "independent
organ of the administration of justice." Id. at 96; see also LANDSMAN, supra note 162, at 48-51 (same);
Feeley, supra note 160, at 754 (contrasting the adversary system with the inquisitorial system).
258. For instance, Justice Scalia, in a dissent from the enactment of the Rule 26 amendments joined
by Justices Souter and Thomas, argued:
The proposed new regime does not fit comfortably within the American judicial system, which
relies on adversariallitigation to develop the facts before a neutral decisionmaker. By placing
upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to their clients-on their own
initiative, and in a context where the lines between what must be disclosed and what need not
be disclosed are not clear but require the exercise of considerable judgment-the new Rule
would place intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients and not to
assist the opposing side.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 113 S. Cl 475, 585 (interim ed. 1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also Denis F. McLaughlin, New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, NJ. LAw., Jan. 10,
1994, at 1 ("[T]he concern is that attorneys feel compromised in their role as advocates in an adversary
system if required to disclose, in the first instance, information damaging to their clients even though
they recognize that, upon request, they would be required to divulge the same information in
discovery.")
The legal community responded to the Rule 26 disclosure proposal with the most commentary in
the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with almost all of the commentary harshly critical.
See Griffin B. Bell et a!., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Refonn, 27 GA. L. REv. 1,
28 (1992) (noting that the proposed changes to Rule 26 ''triggered a storm of criticism"); Randall
Sambom, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited: Committee Debates Further Amendments, NAT'L LJ., May 4,
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taken advantage of the rule's opt-out provision and thus have declined to
institute the mandatory disclosure. 259
Further, the lawyer's zealous representation, so prized in the criminal
realm, is also highly valued in civil litigation. Indeed, most of those who
comment on the role of the lawyer fail to distinguish between civil and
criminal litigation. Although I noted above that certain ethical standards
will depend on whether the lawyer is practicing in the criminal or the civil
realm, these distinctions are the exception, not the norm. In fact, the 1969
Model Code states that ''the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied
to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities."260
While the 1983 Model Rules do make a greater effort to distinguish
between different practice areas,261 they make no general distinction
between lawyers engaged in criminal litigation and those engaged in civil
litigation.
Finally, constitutional due process guarantees inform civil as well as
criminal adjudication, and these, like the constitutional guarantees discussed in the context of criminal litigation, can also be seen as reflecting the
autonomous, distinct role of the citizen. To satisfy due process in the judicial context, the citizen must normally be afforded an opportunity to be
heard before a decision is made that will affect his rights or legally protected interests.262 "The protection of the due process clause is the protection of individual liberty-a condition of liberal citizenship in which the
significance of interests is individually determined."263 Thus, "the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law reflects
the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that we
place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference."264 Like the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, then, the Due
1992, at 1, 12 (noting the large number of negative responses to the mandatory disclosure proposal);
Carl Tobias, The Back-Door Route for Changing Federal Discovery Rules, REcoRDI!R, Feb. 3, 1994, at
8 ("Indeed throughout the rule-revision process, practically all segments of the organized bar, including
plaintiffs [sic] lawyers, defense counsel, civil rights attorneys, and public interest practitioners, had
strongly opposed the proposal.").
259. See, e.g., P. Kevin Castel, Commerciallitigators Focus on Federal Rules, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 24,
1994, ;It S4 (Southern District of New York); Living with Rule 26, N.J. LAW., Jan. 10, 1994, at 6
(Northern District oflliinois); James A. Young & Mary E. Nepps, New Rules Change Federal Practice:
But Not All Provisions in Effect in Eastern District, LEOAL INTELLIGENCI!R, Feb. 2, 1994, at 3 (Eastern
District of Pennsylvania).
260. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RllsPONSffiiLITY preliminary statement (1980).
261. For instance, article 2 of the Model Rules is addressed to the lawyer acting in the capacity of
counselor while article 3 is addressed to the lawyer acting in the capacity of advocate. The Model Rules
also address specific provisions to lawyers representing organizations; see MoDEL RULES oP
PRoFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.13 (1983), and lawyers who act as intermediaries between two clients,
see id. Rule 2.2.
262. Edward D. Re, Due Process, Judicial Review, and the Rights of the Individual, 39 CLBV. ST.
L. REv. 1, 5 (1991).
263. Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of liberal Democratic
Citi1:.enship, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 439 (1987).
264. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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Process Clause prohibits the state from entering the realm of the citizen
unless it provides specific safeguards.265
The way in which a legal system is structured depends on the system's
conception of the citizen and the citizen's relationship with the state.266
This Part has suggested that the adversary system, especially in criminal
adjudication, but also to some extent in civil adjudication, is structured to
comport with our democratic presumption of citizen autonomy. Accordingly, the traditional role of the lawyer, defined by the adversary system,
also presumes autonomous citizens. And if it is the ~odel of the autonomous citizen that gives rise to the lawyer's role as we have traditionally
understood it, then if we redefine the role of the citizen in the adjudicatory
system, we will also redefine the role of the lawyer. The next Part suggests
that that is precisely what the OTS system has done.
VI
OTS's CoNCEPTION OF THE

REGULATED

PERsoN

Part V suggested that the traditional role of the lawyer is a product of
our democratic conception of the citizen and the citizen's relationship with
the state. This Part examines the OTS system and concludes that it is premised on a different model of the citizen. Section A will explore this difference by examining OTS regulations in light of the constitutional guarantees
that inform the adversary system. As discussed in Part V, these guarantees
reflect the citizen's autonomous and distinct role in relation to the state.
OTS regulations, however, are highly problematic in light of these guarantees as they are ordinarily interpreted; in fact, OTS regulations frequently
fall into doctrinal exceptions to the constitutional norms. With this information, Section B goes on to explore the alternative conception of the citizen that is reflected in the OTS system.
A.

1.

The OTS System as Inconsistent with the Constitutional Guarantees
Informing the Adversary System
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and The Fourth Amendment

The two key regulations in the Kaye Scholer case267 are both problematic in light of the privilege against self-incrimination as it is ordinarily
understood.2 68 12 C.F.R. § 563.170(c) requires thrifts to establish and
maintain business records and make those records available to OTS examiners. It is of no matter that the records might contain incriminating evidence. 12 C.F.R. § 563.180 requires thrifts to report periodically to OTS
265. Cheh, supra note 245, at 1369 (noting that "[c]ivil procedural due process, while not as
extensive as criminal law procedural protections, does impose significant safeguards against arbitrary,
oppressive, or erroneous action").
'
266. See Post, supra note 212, at 672.
267. 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.170, .180 (1993).
268. See supra notes 219-31 and accompanying text.
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about their affairs, 269 and they must include in those reports all material
facts regarding all matters in OTS's jurisdiction.Z70 Thus, under OTS's
scheme, thrifts may b,e required by regulation to incriminate themselves. In
fact, OTS regulations extend beyond merely denying thrifts their privilege
against self-incrimination. The privilege enables citizens to refuse to
answer questions when the answers would tend to be incriminating. OTS
regulations not only require thrifts to answer those same questions but also
require them to volunteer incriminating evidence when OTS would find that
evidence relevant.
12 C.P.R.§ 563.170 is also problematic in light of Fourth Amendment
protections. That regulation authorizes OTS to examine and audit thrifts at
any time. 271 These examinations and audits are searches subject to the
Fourth Amendment, since they involve the comprehensive scrutiny of thrift
documents. Nonetheless, OTS may examine and audit without any showing of probable cause or even individualized suspicion.
Although OTS regulations are clearly in tension with ordinary interpretations of the privilege against self-incrimination and the Fourth Amendment, they would no doubt be held constitutional because they fall within
well-established exceptions to the general constitutional rules. The
Supreme Court has decided several cases involving record-keeping provisions that are similar to those promulgated by OTS and has held that "under
some circumstances a person may be required by law-subject to criminal
sanction-to communicate in writing with government officials even
though the communications themselves might be incriminating enough to
support a criminal conviction."272 Similarly, certain administrative inspections utilized to enforce regulatory schemes seem to be exempt from Fourth
Amendment protections and may be authorized simply by statute. This
exception applies in industries that have a long history of supervision273 and
in industries that are pervasively regulated.274
269. 12 C.P.R. § 563.180(a) (1993).
270. Id. § 563.180(b)(l).
271. Id. § 563.170(a)(2).
272. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 10 (1986); see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948)
(~uiring disclosure of records is acceptable "when there is a sufficient relation between the activity
sought to be regulated and the public concern").
273. See, e.g., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (liquor
industry).
274. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,598-604 (1981) (upholding Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act which directed federal officers to inspect underground mines periodically without
providing advance notice); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (firearms industry). It is
said that "banking is the most regulated industry in the United States." LASH, supra note 14, at vii; see
also WHITE, supra note 10, at 25 ("among the most heavily regulated").
Alternatively, OTS regulations might withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge by means of the
"special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Court has upheld searches that arc not
supported by a warrant, probable cause, or even individualized suspicion " 'when "special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make [those requirements] impracticable."' " Skinner v.
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Due Process

Several OTS regulations are in tension with due process guarantees.
The Due Process Clause generally guarantees that the government will provide citizens with specific safeguards before it deprives them of life, liberty
or property. These safeguards reflect the citizen's autonomous and distinct
role in our democratic society. I will discuss four aspects of the OTS
scheme that fail to incorporate the safeguards normally required by the Due
Process Clause.

a.

Temporary Cease and Desist Orders: No Predeprivation Hearings

A central tenet of due process is that persons should have the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner when
their rights are affected. 275 In almost all cases, courts have interpreted that
standard as requiring the government to provide some form of hearing
before depriving an individual of a property or liberty interest.276 Although
a postdeprivation hearing may result in the return of the property or even
the payment of damages, "no later hearing and no damage award can undo
the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural
due process has already occurred."277
As noted in Part I, OTS may issue a temporary cease and desist order
that freezes a defendant's assets without a prior hearing.278 OTS, rather
than an administrative law judge, makes all of the factual determinations
that are necessary to support these orders. Consequently, Professor Coffee
notes that "[i]n this respect, FIRREA deviates from the traditional administrative law model in which a supposedly disinterested party (the ALJ) is
interposed between the enforcement agency and the remedy it desires."279
This broad power to seize assets without prior hearing may, in fact, be
unique to OTS. A few other administrative agencies have statutory authority to issue temporary cease and desist orders; however, their power is generally more limited than that granted to OTS.28° For instance, the SEC may
issue a temporary cease and desist order, but the authorizing statutes explicitly state that "[s]uch an order shall be entered only after notice and opportunity for a hearing, unless the Commission determines that notice and
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment))); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989).
275. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
276. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 500-01 (1993); see also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (liberty interests entitled to same protection as
property).
277. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972).
278. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
279. John C. Coffee, Jr., Due Process for Kaye, Scholer?, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1992, at 22.
280. Nussbaum & Stem, supra note 154, at 1.
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hearing prior to entry would be impracticable or contrary to the public interest."281 The legislative history emphasizes that Congress "views a temporary cease-and-desist order entered on an ex parte basis as an extraordinary
remedy."282
Here again, OTS's powers fall into an exception to the general rule.
Although due process ordinarily requires the government to provide a hearing before depriving a citizen of property, certain "extraordinary situations"
justify postponing the hearing until after the deprivation. 283 In Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mallen 284 the Supreme Court held that "[a]n
important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that
the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases
demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard
until after the initial deprivation."285 When applying this test to cases
involving thrift officers and directors, subsequent courts have had little difficulty upholding OTS's temporary cease and desist orders.286
b.

Conservatorship and Receivership Provisions: Limited Judicial
Review

OTS may seize thrifts, without notice or hearing, and place them under
conservatorship or into receivership. 287 Since defendants are provided no
predeprivation hearings, these provisions raise the same due process concerns discussed above in the context of temporary cease and desist orders.
What is more, the conservatorship and receivership provisions raise additional due process concerns because subsequent judicial review of OTS
action is often extremely limited.
After OTS seizes a thrift, the thrift owner has only one remedy: to
apply to a federal district court for judicial review of OTS's decision. 288 In
order to prevail, thrift owners must normally show that OTS's action was
281. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(c)(l) (Supp.lV 1992); see also id. § 78u-3(c)(l) (identical text); id. § 80a9(f)(3)(A) (substantially identical text); id. § 80b-3(k)(3)(A) (same).
282. H.R. REP. No. 616, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1392.
283. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
284. 486
230 (1988).·
285. ld. at 240.
286. For instance, in Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584
(1992), the Ninth Circuit upheld an OTS temporary cease and desist order, finding that Congress has an
important interest in fighting insider abuse of savings institutions, and that by authorizing tempomry
cease and desist orders, Congress acknowledged a need for prompt action. Id. at 1440. Finally, the
court found that the temporary cease and desist order provided "substantial assumnce" that the charges
were not "baseless or unwarranted" because it set forth detailed findings regarding Spiegel's misconduct
based on examinations. Id.; see also Paul v. OTS, 763 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd witlrollt
opinion sub nom. Paul v. Ryan, 948 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1991).
287. 12 U.S.C § 1464(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
288. Id.

u.s.
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arbitrary and capricious.289 Under this standard, OTS's decision is entitled
to a presumption of "regularity";290 administrative action is considered arbitrary and capricious only where it is not supportable on any rational
basis.291 Moreover, although some courts have held that a thrift owner is
entitled to a full evidentiary trial following a takeover by OTS,292 others
restrict judicial review to the administrative record. 293 In the latter courts,
the thrift owners cannot present any evidence or examine any witnesses. 294
OTS gathers what it determines to be the administrative record and turns it
over to the court.295 Based on this record alone, the judge decides whether
OTS's action was arbitrary or capricious.296 Not surprisingly, given these
standards and procedures, neither OTS nor its predecessor the FHLBB has
ever lost a conservatorship case.297

c.

Capital Directives: No Judicial Review
As noted in Part !,298 capital directives are orders that require thrifts to
take specified steps in order to bring capital levels up to a previously established standard. OTS begins a capital directive enforcement process by
issuing a notice of intent to impose a capital directive. The thrift may
respond to the notice by presenting "information, mitigating circumstances,
documentation or other relevant evidence supporting the [thrift]'s position."299 However, this is the thrift's only formal opportunity to respond to
OTS.300 Thereafter, OTS will decide whether to issue the capital directive,
289. Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1141-42 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1475 (1992); Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400, 1408 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959
(1988); Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d 1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1986).
290. Franklin Sav. Ass'n, 934 F.2d at 1141.
291. San Marino Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 605 F. Supp. 502, 508 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
292. E.g., Haralson v. FHLBB, 655 F. Supp. 1550, 1559·60 (D.D.C. 1987), appeal dismissed, 837
F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 540 F. Supp. 1374, 1377-78 (N.D.
Cal.), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983);
Telegraph Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862, 869 (N.D. Til. 1981) see also Collie v.
FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1151-52 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (requiring hearing unless thrift "has had a
meaningful opportunity to make a case in opposition to the appointment of a receiver at some point
during the process leading to the appointment'').
293. Franklin Sav. Ass'n, 934 F.2d at 1142; Woods, 826 F.2d at 1408; Guaranty Sav. & Loan, 794
F.2d at 1342.
294. See, e.g., Franklin Sav. Ass'n, 934 F.2d at 1139-40.
295. See, e.g., id.
296. See, e.g., id. at 1142.
297. William W. Mahood ill, Comment, Due Process Considerations in the Federal Takeover of
Savings and Loan Associations: The Case for a Hybrid Manner of Review, 40 KAN. L. REv. 1065, 1072
(1992); see also Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. .FHLBB, 572 F. Supp. 997, 1047 (S.D. Fla.)
(''[T]he few courts which have dealt with this statute over its fifty-year history have never restored an
insolvent institution to the association."), rev'd and vacated in part, aff'd in part, 720 F.2d 1499 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 1215 (1984).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 104-12.
299. Daniel B. Gail, Without Due Process: The Use of Capital Directives to Enforce Bank Capital
Rules, 46 CoNSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 214, 215 (1992).
300. /d.
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and the agency has flexible, virtually unfettered authority to craft directives
and to require corrective measures and affirmative actions as it deems necessary to ensure that undercapitalized thrifts reach and maintain minimum
capital levels.301
Even though a capital directive is enforceable to the same extent as an
effective and outstanding final cease and desist order,302 the statute authorizing capital directives does not provide for judicial review of agency
action.303 After examining the statute, the Fifth Circuit held that a capital
directive is completely unreviewable in the courts.304 Thus, a thrift is provided no hearing on the record and no opportunity to cross-examine agency
officials about their conclusions. 305

d.

OTS's Adjudicatory Proceedings

The above three subsections detail specific regulations that are problematic in light of the Due Process Clause. In addition to those specific
provisions, OTS's adjudicatory structure raises due process concerns. First,
the administrative law judge (ALJ) in OTS cases may not be sufficiently
disinterested; and second, even if the ALJ is disinterested, it might be a
moot point because the Director of OTS has substantial independent authority over the adjudication.
1) Disinterested decisionmaker. As noted above, the Due Process
Clause requires the state to provide certain safeguards before depriving citizens of life, liberty or property. One such safeguard is a neutral decisionmaker.306 ALJs in OTS proceedings are employees of OTS307 and
therefore may be too closely associated with the agency to be sufficiently
neutral. Of course, Harris Weinstein, former OTS chief counsel, has maintained that although ALJs are OTS employees, OTS keeps its prosecutorial
and adjudicatory functions rigidly separate. "The two groups of people are
not allowed to talk to each other."308 However, even if the examiners and
prosecutors do not associate with the ALJs, the Director of OTS certainly
does associate with the ALJs, as the following subsection details.
Moreover, even if the ALJs' functions are kept separate from other
OTS departments, we still may fear that ALJs can be subtly influenced simply because the ALJs are OTS employees. After all, ALJs have none of the
salary or tenure protections that Article III judges enjoy, protections that are
301.
302.
303.
304.
(1991).
305.
306.
307.
308.

/d. at 216.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 u.s.c. § 3907 (1988).
FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1125-29 (5th Cir.}, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 170
Gail, supra note 299, at 217.
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
See GIU.ERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 730.
DeBenedictis, supra note 127, at 59 (quoting Harris Weinstein of OTS).
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designed to insulate judges from political and economic pressures.309 An
American Bar Association task force study supports concerns over ALJ partiality. The ABA task force studied Securities and Exchange Commission
administrative hearings over a five-year period and found that the SEC
ALJs upheld the SEC in 58 of 62 cases.310
2) The OTS Director's involvement. Even if OTS ALJs are wholly
disinterested, impartial decisionmakers, it may not matter because their role
in adjudications may be overshadowed by the Director of OTS. ALJs at
OTS have no power to dismiss an action or rule on any motion that will
result in the final determination of the suit. Only the Director of OTS has
that authority. 311 Moreover, after hearing the evidence, the ALJ makes
findings of fact, but instead of issuing a judgment, the ALJ merely issues a
recommended decision to OTS. The Director of OTS has substantial discretion to adopt, reject or modify the ALJ's decision. 312 Thus, the Director
of OTS, the same person who signs the complaint against the defendant, has
the final say over the determination of the matter.313
The ALJ' s arguable lack of impartiality and the Director's involvement in shaping the administrative record might not be so unsettling if cases
were subsequently entitled to broad review in Article Ill courts.314 But just
the opposite is true: review in Article Ill courts tends to be quite narrow.
Article Ill courts rarely, if ever, review cases de novo; instead they must
sustain the agency's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole. 315 And the agency's choice of remedy will not be
disturbed unless it is an abuse of discretion or is otherwise arbitrary or
309. Gu.LERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 730; see also Re, supra note 262, at 3.
310. See ABA Task Force Survey Finds AUs Almost Always Uphold SEC Charges, 21 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) at 1531 (Oct. 13, 1989).
311. 12 C.F.R. § 509.5(b)(7) (1993).
312. See, e.g., id. §§ 509.4, .39, .40; cf Central Nat'1 Bank v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 912
F.2d 897, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1990) Gustifying grant of discretion to Comptroller of the Currency and not
AUs).
313. Kaye Scholer's counsel, Bernard Nussbaum, has repeatedly denounced this aspect of Kaye
Scholer's litigation with OTS. He has maintained that OTS is, in effect, bringing a case before itself.
"Tim Ryan [Director of OTS] is the prosecutor, he held the press conference, and he's the judge. He
will decide whether his complaint is warranted or not." Symposium, supra note 6, at 66. Monroe
Freedman made a similar point when he railed against the danger of the SEC instituting its own
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 169, at 20-24.
"When the SEC seeks to discipline an attorney, it acts not as a disinterested third party, but as a
partisan." Id. at 23.
Although OTS is certainly not the only administrative agency empowered to judge the merits of
actions brought by agency personnel, Professor Koniak observed that
this commonplace practice is troubling because allowing state actors to bring charges, to try a
defendant, and to render a "verdict" provides those actors with the power to insist on a legal
vision that courts might not ratify; defendants might be coerced to give in when faced with this
concentration of power.
Koniak, supra note 181, at 1105 (footnote omitted).
314. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
HARv. L. REv. 915 (1988) (advocating searching reviews of administrative agency decisions).
315. Akin v. OTS, 950 F.2d 1180, 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
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capricious.316 These standards are problematic from a due process perspective simply because the Director of OTS has so much control over shaping
the record as whole.

a

B.

OTS and the Managed Citizen

The constitutional guarantees that inform the adversary system act as
barriers to state action; they are designed to limit the state's power over
citizens. The Supreme Court has understood these guarantees as acknowledging the citizen's private interests and objectives, and thus reflecting our
democratic ascription of citizen autonomy. That the OTS system fails to
incorporate these restraints on state action suggests that the OTS system
does not understand the people it regulates to be autonomous citizens but
rather views them instrumentally as means for achieving specific governmental goals.
What one immediately notices when contrasting the OTS system with
the adversary system is the efficiency of the OTS system. From an instrumental perspective, the constitutional guarantees and other distinctive features that characterize the adversary system are inefficient because they
impede the government's ability to achieve its legitimate regulatory
goals. 317 For instance, although prevention and punishment of crime is
widely accepted as vital to the public interest, the government does not have
free rein to pursue that objective. The citizen is seen as having private
interests and objectives which must be acknowledged and respected.
By contrast, since the OTS system is not hampered by the traditional
constitutional norms, it is free to pursue its own goals efficiently, without
considering the citizen's independent objectives. OTS can be seen, then, as
regulating thrifts by means of what Professor Post has called "managerial
authority."318 Managerial authority presupposes a realm of instrumental
reason; that is, a managerial system is one that takes the pre-established
goals of the system as given and seeks to manipulate the available resources
to attain those pre-established ends. As Professor Selznick phrased it,
" 'Management' suggests rational, efficiency-minded, goal-driven organization .... Ends are characteristically taken as given, and every act is justified
by the contribution it makes to those ends. All else is a distraction." 319
Organizations, for example, typically regulate their members managerially. Organizations are goal-oriented; that is, they are "formally estab316. /d.; see also supra note 85.
317. 'The criminal procedural protections set out in the Constitution are extremely costly and time
consuming. In fact, they may add nothing to and even frustrate the goals of fairness, accuracy, and
truth-finding." Cheh, supra note 245, at 1351.
318. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1775 (1987) [hereinafter Post, Between Governance]; Post, sr1pra note
212, at 658.
319. PHU.IP SELZNICK, THE MORAL CoMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THB PROMISB OP
COMMUNITY 289-90 (1992).
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lished for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals."320 The
organizational goals are taken as value premises, and the function of the
organization is to implement these premises,321 preferably by the most efficient means available.322 Organizations seek to arrange and manipulate
their resources, including their human resources, so ·as to achieve their institutional ends most efficiently.323 To that end, organizations typically distribute various tasks among various positions in the organization.324 So, for
example, a school system will arrange administrators, faculty, faculty support, library staff, and miscellaneous other individuals to attain its goal of
educating students.
An individual's role in an organization is functionally defined by the
organization's needs. 325 As members of the organization, individuals are
expected to subordinate their personal goals in order to achieve the organization's goals.326 "Organizations thus strive to ensure that 'their personnel
should not be influenced by extra-organizational factors,' and they attempt
functionally to define for their members specifically organizational roles
that predominate over the multiple roles and statuses characteristic of the
general society."327
This discussion of organizations is apposite to the OTS system because
OTS regulates thrifts in the same way that an organization regulates its
members. 328 In response to the S&L crisis, Congress bestowed on OTS
significant control over all aspects of thrift practice-over everything from
320. PETER M. BLAu & W. RICHARD Scorr, FoRMAL ORGANIZATIONs: A CoMPARATIVE APPROACH
5 (1962); Talcott Parsons, Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations-!, I
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 63, 64 (1956) ("As a formal analytical point of reference, primacy of orientation to the
attainment ofa specific goal is used as the defining characteristic of an organization which distinguishes
it from other types of social systems."); PHILIP SELZNicK, LAw, SociETY, AND INDuSTRIAL JuSTICE 7778 (1969).
321. Post, Between Governance, supra note 318, at 1788.
322. BLAu & Scorr, supra note 320, at 49.
323. Post, Between Governance, supra note 318, at 1767.
324. FRoM MAX WEBER: EssAYS IN SociOLOGY 196 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds.,
1946); Parsons, supra note 320, at 68 (describing a "more familiar approach to the structure of an
organization •.• through its constituent personnel and the roles they play in its functioning"); see also
id. at 77 (describing the internal allocation of an organization's resources).
325. See Post, Between Governance, supra note 318, at 1792; see also Parsons, supra note 320, at
67 (an organization's value pattern "defines the basic orientation of the ... organization" and "guides
the activities of participant individuals'').
326. ''The organization is constituted by formal offices and rules connecting them. People are
secondary, in that they merely fill the offices, enacting their formal requirements and carrying out
specified rules and fulfiJling preexisting expectations." MEIR DAN-COHEN, R!GHrS, PERsoNs, AND
ORGANIZATIONS 34-35 (1986); see also SELZNicK, supra note 320, at 78 (describing Max Weber's view
that the "parts" of a bureaucratic organization are "offices, not persons").
327. Post, Between Governance, supra note 318, at 1792-93 (footnotes omitted) (quoting CHARLES
B. PERRow, ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYsis: A SociOLOGICAL VIEW 51 (1970)). As Professor Parsons put
it, the focus of an organization's value system must be the "legitimation of the primacy of this goal over
other possible interests and values of the organization and its members." Parsons, supra note 320, at 68.
328. An alternative way of getting at this same idea might be to say that OTS regulates thrifts in the
same way that it regulates its own employees.
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capitalization329 to personnel decisions. 330 This control is not mediated by
the constitutional guarantees discussed above, guarantees that require the
government to take account of the citizen's independent objectives. Rather,
the OTS system is structured on the assumption that thrifts have no
independent objectives. 331 The role of the thrift in the OTS system is functionally defined by OTS's regulatory goals. So instead of viewing the thrift
as occupying a realm that is distinct from the state's realm, OTS regards the
thrift as enveloped within OTS's instrumental orientation.
OTS's controversial reporting and disclosure requirements provide a
nice example of the way that OTS defines the thrift's role in terms of its
own regulatory needs. OTS' s primary institutional goal is to ensure a
strong, viable thrift industry. 332 To achieve this, OTS must promulgate substantive rules which, if obeyed, will produce the desired results. But, as any
law enforcement officer knows, substantive legal rules may not be enough;
to carry out its mission in the most efficient way, OTS must also have the
means to determine when thrifts are violating the rules. Not surprisingly,
then, OTS regulations require that thrifts provide it with this necessary
information. Thrifts must submit to periodic examinations. Thrifts must
establish and maintain records and make them available whenever OTS
might ask for them. Thrifts and their agents must report to OTS and disclose all material facts concerning all matters within OTS's jurisdiction.
Any interest that a thrift might have in keeping this information confidential
is subordinated toOTS's need to achieve its regulatory goals.
Moreover, because its need to achieve its goals is paramount, OTS
must similarly manage the lawyers who represent thrifts. Accordingly, the
Notice of Charges and the resulting Settlement Order in the Kaye Scholer
case can be seen as OTS's attempt to define the lawyer's role as one which
advances OTS's objectives. Lawyers must volunteer facts that are adverse
or irrelevant to their theory of the case if they suspect that OTS has a differ329. See supra text accompanying notes 104-12.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
331. OTS never speaks of imposing its goals on thrifts; rather, it simply assumes that thrifts share
its goals. A speech given by OTS Regional Director Eric Shand to the California League of Savings
Institutions (on file with author) provides a fine example of this. Mr. Shand's short speech, the
transcript of which is only eight double-spaced pages, referred no less than six times to the common
interests and common goals shared by OTS and the thrifts. See also John Burke, The Examiners are
Coming, OUTLooK FED. HoME LoAN BANK Svs., Jan./Feb. 1987, at 4, 6 (referring to the "common-goal
approach" to thrift examination).
332. Robert Cooper, Note, The Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 FoRDHAM L. REV. S363, S368
(1991); see also 12 U.S.C § 1463(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (the Director of OTS is to "provide for the
examination, safe and sound operation, and regulation of savings associations"). For a discussion of
banking regulatory goals in general, see KENNEn! SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS 5-12 (1983); LASH, supra note 14, at 22-26.
Of course this discussion assumes OTS's stated goals. There may be a great divergence between
an organization's stated goals and its "operational" or "reflexive" goals. See, e.g., WARREN B. BROWN
& DENNIS J. MOBERG, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND MANAGEMENT: A MACRO APPROACH 239-43
(1980); DAN-CoHEN, supra note 326, at 36-38.
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ent theory of the case. Moreover, lawyers cannot represent any thrift that is
attempting to evade even the spirit of the banking regulations by placing
form over substance. The obligations that OTS imposes on lawyers preclude them from assuming any role but that which furthers OTS's regulatory goals.333
Because the OTS system regulates thrifts and their lawyers managerially, the adversarial nature of adjudication that we are accustomed to in the
adversary system is sharply diminished in the OTS system. The OTS system contemplates that the thrift, its lawyers and OTS will all work together
in pursuit of a common, pre-established goal. OTS's goals are seen as controlling, and the need to achieve those goals justifies OTS' s manipulation of
all available resources, including thrifts and their lawyers.
Needless to say, the assumptions underlying the OTS system are in
sharp contrast with those on which our democratic self-government is
based.334 Democracy envisions autonomous citizens who choose their own
goals. "Autonomy requires that ends as well as means be developed from
within, not imposed from without."335 Therefore, while democracy constitutes autonomous citizens, managerial authority creates "subjects."336 As
Professor Selznick put it, "People subject to managerial direction may be
thought of as interchangeable, deployable, expendable units, to be used or
discarded as efficiency may require." 337 Professor Post similarly described
the contrast thus:
Managerial structures locate citizens within the constraints of instrumental reason, assuming therefore that citizens are objects of
regulation, subject to the laws of cause and effect. Structures of
self-governance, in contrast, situate citizens within webs of herme333. Moreover, the Settlement Order does not defme the lawyer's role solely by regulating the
lawyer's obligations; it does so also by subtly seeking to align the lawyer's interests with its own. For
instance, the Settlement Order requires that Kaye Seholer appoint a banking partner with at least ten
years experience to supervise the representation of an insured depository institution. Settlement Order,
supra note 145, para. 4. Although this requirement may be designed primarily to ensure that thrifts
receive competent advice, the requirement also serves to align Kaye Scholer's interests with OTS's, and
it thereby increases the likelihood that Kaye Scholer will function within the role that OTS has defined
for it. A banking lawyer with ten years experience has a large investment in her career as a banking
lawyer. She will typically be very concerned about her reputation with the banking agencies, and for
that reason she may be Jess likely to become overly aggressive with the agency on behalf of any one
client. In contrast to Peter Fishbein, who can fall back on a general litigation practice, a banking
lawyer's career might be completely ruined if she were barred from practicing before the banking
agencies.
334. Professor Cohen observes that heteronomous structures, such as the military, "are intensely
antithetical to democracy." CoHEN, supra note 206, at 271.
335.

Id.

336. Id. at 272. "[T]he citizen, in a heteronomous government, is most fundamentally the
instrument of another, a tool for the accomplishment of some higher purpose imposed from without."
Id. at 271.
337.

SELZNicK, supra note 319, at 290.
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neutic interactions, assuming therefore that citizens are autonomous
and self-determining.338
Given the foregoing account, it is not surprising that the OTS system
and the adversary system place different obligations on lawyers. The nature
of any legal system will depend "upon whether [it is] intended to foster
interactions among citizens who are autonomous or, instead, among citizens
who are not." 339 Traditional legal ethics rules reflect the adversary system's presumption of autonomous citizens. The traditional lawyer's zealous partisanship and strict duty of confidentiality, for example, express
respect for the citizen's independent interests. The OTS system, by contrast, presupposes a managed citizen, an entity to be manipulated for a specified purpose. The OTS system i~ structured so as to preclude recognition
of the citizen's independent interests; thus, the above-mentioned features of
the traditional lawyer's role can have no place in such a system.
The Kaye Scholer controversy, then, involves much more than a dispute over legal ethics rules and the appropriate role of the lawyer. What is
at stake in the Kaye Scholer controversy is the citizen's role and relationship with the state.
VII
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This Comment has suggested that a useful way to understand the Kaye
Scholer controversy is to view the conflicting obligations confronting Kaye
Scholer as reflecting different conceptions of the role of the citizen. This
Comment has not, however, examined the normative question implicit in
the discussion: in what domains_ do we want to subject citizens to managerial authority? Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the Comment; however, this Part will explore some considerations that might be relevant in
assessing the desirability of the OTS system.
We might find the OTS system acceptable because it primarily regulates corporations, not individuals. Our legal system already distinguishes
between citizens and corporations, at least to some extent. For instance, the
privilege against self-incrimination has never been available to corporations.340 One might argue more broadly, as Professor Meir Dan-Cohen has,
that legal rules derived from notions of autonomy should have only very
limited application to organizations such as corporations. He reaches this
338. Post, supra note 212, at 673. Pr.ofessor Selznick similarly contrasts management and
governance. See SELZNICK, supra note 319, at 289-90.
339. Post, supra note 212, at 672. "From the point of view of the designer of the structure,
therefore, the presence or absence of autonomy functions as an axiomatic and foundational principle."
Id. at 672-73.
340. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 699 (1944) ("Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be
utilized by or on behnlf of any organization, such as a corporation."); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 6970 (1906).
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conclusion after observing that organizations should not be identified with
their members because they have different goals,341 so that reference to
members' autonomy rights can only justify very limited autonomy rights
for organizations.342 Hence, even though a democracy must ascribe autonomy to its individual citizens, it may not need to extend the status of citizen
to legally established entities such as corporations.
If corporations themselves do not command the status of citizen, then
managerially regulating the corporation's members poses little problem.
Members of a corporation are already subject to the corporation's instrumental orientation and managerial authority. This perspective might lead
one to conclude that the OTS system is not redefining citizens as managed
subjects; rather, OTS takes persons who have already been placed in ftmctionally defined roles and merely reshapes those roles in accordance with
OTS's regulatory objectives. Thrift owners, outside of their corporate
capacity, can still enjoy the wide variety of roles characteristic of autonomous citizens.343
Another reason we might feel justified in imposing managerial authority on thrifts is because OTS suits are usually civil actions. As noted in Part
V,3 44 civil litigation does not present a clear picture of the autonomou~ citizen; instead it incorporates managerial features that modify the autonomous
role of the citizen when doing so is necessary to further its goal of administering justice efficiently. Thus, to the extent that OTS suits can justifiably
be labeled civil, one can argue that the OTS system does not present so
radical a departure from adversarial norms.
However, the distinction between civil cases and criminal cases tends
to blur in the OTS context.345 Although suits brought against thrifts are
technically civil suits, they nevertheless raise many of the same concerns
that arise in the criminal context. Ail OTS suit, like a criminal action, pits
the citizen against the coercive power of the state.346 Additionally, the pen341. DAN·CoHEN, supra note 326, at 38.
342. ld. at 77-78.
343. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Walde, the
District Court of Columbia Circuit held that, absent some evidence that a fonner officer or director of a
failed S&L is liable to the S&L, the Resolution Trust Corporation does not have authority to subpoena
personal fmancial infonnation from the fonner officer or director for the sole purpose of determining
whether that person has sufficient net wealth to warrant suing. !d. at 949. The court distinguished
between subpoenas seeking corporate records and those seeking personal records, stating that
" 'corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.' " ld. at
948 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 245-66.
345. For a general discussion on the difficulty of distinguishing between civil and criminal Jaw, see
Cheh, supra note 245, at 1348·69; Jonathan I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for
Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CoRNELL L. REv. 478, 491-506 (1974).
346. However, the resemblance between an OTS defendant and a defendant in an ordinary criminal
case may be slight The typical criminal defendant is an impoverished social outcast The typical OTS
defendant is more likely to be a sophisticated business person with considerable resources. Cf. David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 iwtv_ L. REv. 801, 819 (1992) (noting that the

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 713 1994

714

CAUFORNIA IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 82:663

alties for violating certain regulations might be seen as resembling penal
sanctions.347 For instance, under its three-tier civil money penalty structure, OTS may assess a penalty of up to $1 million per day on thrifts that
knowingly commit certain violations. 348 Sanctions of $1 million per day
for ''knowing" offenses are arguably punitive.349 Thus, in many ways OTS
suits look less like civil litigation, which is concerned with administering
justice between the parties, and more like criminal litigation, which constitutes the citizen's relationship with the state.
Resemblances between an OTS proceeding and a criminal proceeding
might counsel against subjecting thrifts to managerial authority. Criminal
adjudication defines the relationship between the citizen and the state, and
in keeping with our democratic ascription of citizen autonomy, it is where
we are at greatest pains to limit the government's use of instrumental
rationality over citizens. Moreover, autonomy is seen as especially important in criminal proceedings because the stakes for the defendant are so high
and the interests of the parties are so divergent. Managerial systems, by
contrast, are premised on the notion that the system's goals are shared by all
those subject to the system's authority. Of course, phrasing the propositions in that way presupposes that individuals can properly have interests
independent of the regulatory system's interests. That phrasing, then, is
presumptuous since the question that we are seeking to answer is the antecedent question of when we want to permit the state to regulate persons as
though such divergent interests do not exist. Nonetheless, one consideration in assessing the desirability of imposing managerial authority in a particular domain may be the extent to which that imposition alters cherished
beliefs about personhood and social roles. Imposing managerial authority
in the criminal arena may represent too sharp a divergence from traditional
conceptions, so that to the extent OTS proceedings resemble criminal proceedings we may wish to be cautious in approving the OTS managerial
regime.
Perhaps the strongest justification for locating thrifts within a managerial regime is our vital need for a well-functioning bank and thrift industry.
relationship between investment banking czar Michael Milken and his principal lawyer Arthur Limnn, n
partner in one of New York's most prestigious law firms, does not substantially resemble the
relationship between most criminal defendants and their lawyers). Nonetheless, an OTS defendant is
still placed in a relatively weak position when confronting the state.
347. See First Nat'! Bank v. Department of the Treasury, 911 F.2d 57, 64 (8th Cir. 1990) (referring
to an Office of the Comptroller of the Currency civil penalty as a "penni sanction"); cf. United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (extending double jeopardy protections to civil proceedings
seeking very large penalties). Following Halper, commentators have called for other enhanced
procedural protections in civil proceedings where the government seeks very large penalties. See, e.g.,
Cheh, supra note 245, at 1384-89 (arguing that the privilege against self-incrimination should also
· extend to such proceedings).
348. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1992).
349. Cf. Baxter, supra note 41, at S194 (noting the "unduly punitive approach to banking
supervision").
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Depository institutions have always been among the most heavily regulated
entities in the American economy.350 This extensive regulation reflects the
American political system's long-standing and deeply rooted belief that
depository institutions are "special"; their crucial roles as providers of
credit to businesses and households and as custodians of funds deposited by
the rest of the economy make them special.351 It has been argued that
"[t]he continued economic growth of this country is clearly dependent
upon the existence of fmancially sound and capably managed private lending institutions."352 The S&L debacle of the 1980s evidences the disastrous
consequences that can result when we fail to regulate such institutions
efficiently. 353
Along that same line, we may feel relatively comfortable with the OTS
system because it implicates only a small, relatively discrete group of entities in our society.354 The people who are subject to OTS's managerial
authority are generally well aware of that fact3 55 and have chosen to place
themselves in that position. However, appeals to consent may be problematic where it is the government that is exercising managerial authority over
citizens.
On the one hand, an organization's use of managerial authority over its
members is generally considered appropriate because the members voluntarily joined the organization; that is, they consented to the organization's
authority over them. 356 One could argue analogously, then, that persons
who choose to enter the highly regulated thrift industry consent to OTS's
managerial control over them. Courts have reasoned along these lines in
the Fourth Amendment context: certain administrative inspections in industries that are pervasively regulated or that have a long history of regulation
are exempt from Fourth Amendment protections on the ground that heavily
regulated industries do not expect much privacy.357
On the other hand, the notion of consent may be troubling in the realm
of governmental authority over citizens since consent implies free choice; if
the government imposes managerial authority over too many aspects of life,
then the "consent'' will be rendered a fiction. Thus, it seems that we come·
back to the question of how limited the scope of the regulation is.
350. WHITE, supra note 10, at 25; LASH, supra note 14, at vii.
351. WHITE, supra note 10, at 25.
352. S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3532, 3536.
353. The collapse of the savings and loan industry has been described as "the greatest regulatory
fiasco in American history." EICHLER, supra note 12, at vii. The cost to taxpayers has been estimated at
upwards of $1 trillion. Felsenfeld, supra note 12, at S29 & n.144.
354. However, one might well argue about the scope of "institution-affiliated parties." See supra
notes 49-52 and accompanying text
355. Concededly, Kaye Scholer seemed unaware that it was subject to OTS's managerial authority,
but that is because it misinterpreted the role of its client in the regulatory system. Other law firms are
not likely to make the same mistake in the OTS context or in a similar regulatory context.
356. Post, Between Governance, supra note 318, at 1785.
357. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text
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Although we may very well decide that managerial authority is appropriate and justified in the OTS context, we may still wish to be somewhat
cautious about such authority due to the tendency of instrumental rationality
to feed on itself and expand its power. 358 One possible example of this
expansion can be seen in the recent enhancements to the SEC's enforcement powers. FIRREA granted broad powers to OTS as a result, of the
calamitous S&L scandal. Soon after: · but with no similar provocation,
Congress replicated virtually the same powers for the SEC despite the
admonitions of commentators who counseled against enhancing the
powers. 359
This concern about the expansion of managerial authority points out
the importance of simply recognizing when the government is establishing
managerial structures of authority. In the Kaye Scholer case we found that
discussing legal ethics rules in isolation did little to advance our understauding of what is more fundamentally at stake in the case. We must first
be aware that we are being subject to managerial authority so that we can
make informed, principled choices about whether the managerial structure
is appropriate in the given domain, and more importantly, so that we can
take steps to control the structures we have created instead of allowing them
to control us.

As Professor Post compellingly described it,
[W]e ought not to be quite so quick to embmce a world of "undeviating organization" (as
members of the Frankfurt school would chamcterize it). The nightmare vision of Michel
Foucault demonstmtes clearly enough the true nature of such a world. Structures of control
acquire their own life, tum, and bite the progressive hand that establishes them.
Post, supra note 212, at 677 (footnote omitted) (quoting THEODOR W. ADoRNo & MAx HoRKHEIMBR,
DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 87 (John Cumming trans., 1972)).
359. See, e.g., Pitt & Johnson, supra note 153, at 30 n36 (" 'However familiar the FIRREA
provisions are now to the members of Congress who struggled so in ensuring their adoption, they are not
necessarily provisions that. should be provided to the other agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission.' ") (quoting Letter from ABA Section of Business Law to Donald W. Riegel, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 18, 1990)).
358.
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